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IN LAWRENCE V TEXAS' the United States Supreme Court cited
four cases from the European Court of Human Rights as persuasive
authority for the proposition that criminalizing homosexual sex was
unconstitutional.2 Since that time, the propriety of such reliance has
been a matter of debate.3 One result of this attention is that, for the
first time, many lawyers became aware of the existence of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. Nevertheless, most know very little
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. The four cases are: Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1982), P. G.
&j H. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44787/98, para. 56 (Eur. Ct. H. R., Sept. 25, 2001),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR (follow the "HUDOC" hyperlink; then follow
the "Access Hudoc" hyperlink; then search for Application No. "44787/98"); Modinos v.
Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 16 Eur. H.. Rep. 485 (1993); Norris v. Ireland, App. No.
10581/83, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186, 142 Eur. Ct. H. R. 186 (1988).
European Court of Human Rights cases can be found at the website http://
www.echr.coe.int/ECHR (follow the "HUDOC" hyperlink; then follow the "Access Hudoc"
hyperlink; then search for the Application Number) [hereinafter "HUDOC Search"].
3. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Is There Room for the World in Our Courts?, WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 2005, at B4; The Insidious Wiles of Foreign Influence, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2005, at 25,
25. Members of Congress have criticized the Court for referring to foreign law in interpret-
ing the Constitution and have introduced resolutions to ban reliance on foreign law in
constitutional cases. Id. at 26. Some groups have even called for impeachment of Justice
Kennedy because of his reliance on foreign law. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on
Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3. A debate on the topic between
Justices Breyer and Scalia was televised nationally on January 13, 2005 on C-SPAN. Discus-
sion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer: Constitutional Rele-
vance of Foreign Court Decisions (C-SPAN television broadcast Jan. 13, 2005), transcript
available at http://www.american.edu/media/ (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then fol-
low "Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and
Stephen Breyer-AU Washington College of Law, Jan. 13" hyperlink). Some of the criti-
cism was the result of the Court's opinion in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005),
banning the death penalty for juveniles which, while referring to foreign law, did not cite
any cases from the European Court on Human Rights. Id. See also, Mary Ann Glendon,
Judicial Tourism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2004, at A14.
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about it. Indeed, some may confuse it with the similarly named, but
completely separate, European Court of Justice.
4
There are several pan-European organizations that have trans-
formed the governance of much of the continent. The best known in
the United States is the European Union ("EU"), an economic and, to
some extent, political union of twenty-five countries. 5 The EU in-
cludes all of the Western European countries (except Norway and
Switzerland) and, as a result of a recent expansion, a number of for-
mer Communist bloc countries. 6 But there are other pan-European
organizations as well. One that is less well known in the United States
is the Council of Europe to which all European countries except Be-
larus belong.7 The Council of Europe is the parent of the European
4. See, for example, Stephen Breyer, Constitutionalism, Privatization, and Globalism:
Changing Relationships Among European Constitutional Courts, 21 CAMuozo L. REv. 1045, 1049,
1056-57 (2000), for a brief description of this Court and its relationship-or lack
thereof-to the Strasbourg Court. The European Court of Justice is located in Luxem-
bourg. Id.
5. EUEnlargement: Something to Celebrate, ECONOMIST, May 1, 2004, at 12, 12; The Future
of Europe: A Club in Need of a New Vision, ECONOMIST, May 1, 2004, at 25, 25.
6. See supra note 5.
7. Council of Eur., The Council of Europe's Member States, http://www.coe.int/T/
E/Com/About_.Coe/MemberStates/default.asp. While Belarus applied for membership
in 1993, it has not yet been accepted. Council of Eur., Belarus and the Council of Europe,
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/AboutCoe/Member-states/eBelarus.asp#TopOfPage.
In 1997, it was suspended from having "Special Guest Status" and a request for reinstate-
ment of this status was rejected in 2004. 1d. The reason for the suspension-a lack of demo-
cratic legitimacy-was set out in a press release. See Press Release, Council of Eur., Belarus
Suspended (Jan. 13, 1997), available at http://press.coe.int/cp/97/lla(97).htm. The
members include several countries which are only partly in Europe, such as Russia and
Turkey, and includes three countries-Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia which are, ar-
guably, wholly in Asia. Geographers differ on the boundary between Europe and Asia,
which in any event is more of a cultural artifact since, physically, Europe and Asia are parts
of a single landmass. There is general agreement that the Ural Mountains, a long but
somewhat low range rarely reaching as much as 5000 feet in elevation and the north shore
of the Caspian Sea in central Russia form the eastern boundary of Europe, but the bound-
ary between the Caspian and Black Seas is uncertain. The ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA places
the boundary about 100 miles north of the Caucasus Mountains along the Manych Depres-
sion, an ancient watercourse that once connected the Caspian Sea to the Sea of Azov-an
arm of the Black Sea. Europe, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANiCA MACROPEDIA 1033 (15th ed.
1984); Manych Depression, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANICA MICROPEDA 586 (15th ed. 1984)
(further defining the Manych Depression). The World Almanac, the National Geographic,
and the Cartographic Office of the United Nations place the boundary along the ridge line
of the Caucasus Mountains (a much more significant range than the Urals), which, if the
border of Europe, contains its highest mountain, Mount Elbrus, over 18,000 feet high.
2005 WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 467 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 WORLD ALMANAC];
Nat'l Geographic, MapMachine, Map of Europe, http://mapmachine.nationalgeographic.
com/mapmachine/viewandcustomize.html?task=getMap&themeId=P56 (last visited Sept.
8, 2005); United Nations, Central and Eastern Europe, http://www.un.org/Depts/Carto-
graphic/map/profile/easteuro.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2005). Under either of these defi-
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Court of Human Rights ("Strasbourg Court"8 or "Court").9
The Council of Europe was founded in 194910 and thus predates
the European Union. It has a number of functions,11 one of the most
important of which is to serve as the parent organization for the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("European Convention on Human Rights" or "Convention") and for
the European Court of Human Rights created by the Convention. 12
While a few pan-European decisions affecting human rights come
from other sources (including, occasionally, from the European Court
of Justice-the highest court of the European Union), most come
from the Strasbourg Court created by the Convention.' 3
nitions Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are Asian countries. But a third (implicit)
definition is simply a political one not following any natural geographical features, but
rather following the border of the former Soviet Union with Iran and Turkey, which is
presumably the definition used by the Council of Europe since it makes these three coun-
tries European. Of course, by including all of present day Russia, the jurisdiction of the
Strasbourg Court extends to Vladivostok, which is to the east of China, and to the Bering
Strait, within a few miles of Alaska. Since France considers its overseas possessions to be
part of France (and gives them full representation in its Parliament and a vote for Presi-
dent), the Strasbourg Court has jurisdiction over, inter alia, Tahiti and New Caledonia,
several islands in the Indian Ocean, as well as Guadalupe and Martinique in the Carribean.
See Piermont v. France, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 301 (1995) (applying the Convention to French
actions in Tahiti and New Caledonia); 2005 WORLD ALMANAC, supra at 776-77 (listing
French overseas possessions).
8. The European Court of Human Rights is located in Strasbourg, France and is
often referred to in Europe as the "Strasbourg Court" to distinguish it from the somewhat
similarly named European Court ofJustice (located in Luxembourg and unrelated to the
Strasbourg Court) or from other courts dealing with human rights, such as the Latin Amer-
ican Human Rights Court.
9. Council of Eur., Human Rights: Protection, Promotion and Prevention, http://
www.coe.int/T/E/Com/AboutCoe/Human-rights.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) [herein-
after Council Summary].
10. Council of Eur., About the Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/
about-coe/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) [hereinafter About the Council].
11. See A Breath of Fresh Air, ECONOMIST, May 15, 2004, at 50, 50, for a critique of the
current Council of Europe made in the context of a discussion of an upcoming contested
election for Secretary-General of the Council, its Chief Executive Officer.
12. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by Protocol 11 to the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery
Established Thereby, May 11, 1994, art. 19, Europ. T.S. No. 155, 33 I.L.M. 960, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter Convention]
(Articles 1-18 are contained in U.N.T.S., while arts. 19-51 are contained in Europ. T.S.;
I.L.M. is an unofficial source provided as a parallel cite.).
13. Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DuKE J.
COMP. & INr'L L. 95, 95 (2003); see generally Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the Euro-
pean Union: Who Decides? Possible Conflicts Between the European Court ofJustice and the European
Court of Human Rights, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 301, 301-03 (2001) (noting that only recently
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Though the European Convention on Human Rights was
promulgated over fifty years ago, and the Strasbourg Court is over
forty years old and has been issuing significant decisions from its in-
ception, it has received almost no recognition in United States juris-
prudence. Lawrence v. Texas was the first time a majority of the United
States Supreme Court ever referred to decisions of the Strasbourg
Court. 14
Lest the ignoring of potentially relevant persuasive authority be
viewed as a one-sided snub by United States courts, the Strasbourg
Court has been almost as dismissive of American authority. Although
in Soering v. United Kingdom1 5 the Court analyzed American law, 16 most
other references to American law come in concurring or dissenting
opinions.17
has protection of human rights become a major concern of the European Court of
Justice).
14. Justice Breyer, in three dissents from denial of certiorari in cases involving the
amount of time between conviction of a capital crime and execution, referred to the case
of Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989), which involved the same issue.
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 914 (1998); Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (1992). There has been only one decision in a lower federal court
referring to a Strasbourg Court case as, arguably, persuasive authority. Bockting v. Bayer,
399 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly, there is only one state court case relying on
a Strasboug Court case. Kamasinksi v. McLaughlin, No. 2001-E-0386, 2003 WL 367745
(N.H. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2003) (holding a Strasbourg Court decision to have a collateral
estoppel effect on an issue raised by the plaintiff who had previously been a party to that
case).
15. 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989).
16. Id. The issue in Soering was whether Britain could extradite the applicant, who
allegedly murdered two people in Virginia, to the United States to face a capital charge. Id.
at 475. The Strasbourg Court held that the extradition would violate the Convention on
Human Rights at least in part because the interval between a death penalty conviction and
carrying out the sentence-six to eight years-violated Article 3 of the Convention. Id.
Article 3 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment." Convention, supra note 12, art. 3. The interval of time was calcu-
lated by reference to pertinent cases from the Virginia Supreme Court and the United
States district courts. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 478. The period of time that existed in
Virginia between conviction and probable execution was deemed to be in violation of Arti-
cle 3. Id. at 473.
17. It is hard to determine exactly how many American cases may be cited or referred
to in decisions of the Strasbourg Court. A search of the Strasbourg Court database using
"United States Supreme Court," "U.S. Supreme Court," "U.S.," "LEd.," and "S. Ct." pro-
duces eight cases, with most of the citations in concurring or dissenting opinions. See Coun-
cil of Eur., European Court of Human Rights, Home Page, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr
(last visited Sept. 3, 2005). A search by the names of a number of famous Supreme Court
cases (e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), produced two additional dissents referring to
Miranda without citation, one recent majority opinion referring to Roe v. Wade, and a ma-
jority opinion referring merely to the Pentagon Papers case, without citation. Only in five
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Superficially, at least, the recognition of decisions of the Stras-
bourg Court in law reviews in the United States is much better. A
Westlaw search for "European Court of Human Rights" in Journals
and Law Reviews yields 2818 articles, notes, and comments using the
phrase-1160 of which were written after January 1, 2001, when the
full effects of a radical reorganization of the Strasbourg Court became
clear. 18 The overwhelming majority of these articles cite or discuss
only one or a small number of cases decided by the Strasbourg
Court 19 without any discussion of the history or structure of the Court
or the problems or challenges facing the Court. Only a handful of
articles deal with the structure of, or the problems facing, the Stras-
bourg Court, and none offer a comprehensive analysis of these
issues. 20
of these eleven cases did the majority opinion refer to United States Supreme Court cases,
and with one possible exception (Appleby v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38
(2003)), the citations were not used as persuasive authority. I have found only two cases
citing state court decisions. See Appleby v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38 (2003);
Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439. Appleby cites seventeen United States state court cases that
come to differing conclusions on the issue of whether speakers can be restricted in pri-
vately owned shopping centers. Appleby, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 789-90. In Appleby, the right of
the privately owned shopping center to exclude speakers was upheld as not being in viola-
tion of Article 10 of the Convention. Id at 795. Doubtless, there are other references to
United States cases, but they are few and far between.
18. Westlaw search, JLR database, June 12, 2005. Approximately 250 articles a year
appeared with the phrase "European Court of Human Rights" during the years 2000-2002.
In the next two years the number increased to approximately 340 articles a year. So far,
curiously, in the first six months of 2005 there have been only fifty-four such articles con-
taining the phrase, although that may be a function of delay in uploading articles onto
Westlaw. While the reorganization of the Strasbourg Court, see discussion infra Part I, took
effect in 1998, because of a lengthy transition, the full effects of the reorganization were
not well perceived until about 2001. Thus, even the few articles written prior to 2001 dis-
cussing the organization or operation of the Court offer little insight into the current oper-
ation of the Court.
19. The statement that an "overwhelming majority of these articles only cite or discuss
one or a small number of cases" is based on perusing all articles reported in Westlaw men-
tioning the Strasbourg Court since January 1, 2001.
20. Some of the best recent articles dealing with structure or problems are Breyer,
supra note 4 (written after an "official" visit to the European Court ofJustice and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights); Jean-Paul Costa, The European Court of Human Rights and Its
Recent Case Law, 38 TEX. INr'L L.J. 455 (2003) (written by a current Vice President of the
Strasbourg Court); MarkJanis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 CoNN.J. INT'L L. 39 (2000);
Richard Kay, The European Human Rights System as a System of Law, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 55
(2000); Gerda Kleijnkamp, Comparing the Application and Interpretation of the United States
Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, 2 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 307 (2003) (though dealing primarily with family law issues, it has a useful compari-
son between the European Court of Human Rights and American Courts); Paul Mahoney,
New Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights Resulting from the Expanding Caseload
and Membership, 21 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 101 (2002) (written by the Registrar of the Stras-
bourg Court); see alsoJohn Hedigan, The European Convention on Human Rights and Counter-
[Vol. 40
Nevertheless, some knowledge of what the European Court of
Human Rights is, and what it is authorized to do, is important for
American lawyers (and judges) (1) because it is a major court decid-
ing issues of universal interest, and (2) because its decisions may have
effects on any American business involved in commerce with Eu-
rope.21 As to the first reason, while neither the Strasbourg Court nor
the United States Supreme Court need follow the precedents of the
other court, the decisions of one may be useful in informing the other
of issues and problems they each face.22 As to the second reason, deci-
sions of the Strasbourg Court in the area of freedom of expression
involving, inter alia, commercial speech, libel, and internet access
should be of great interest to any practitioner advising American busi-
nesses with international interests. Conversely, any European lawyer
advising an international business should be aware of contemporary
United States jurisprudence in these areas. Beyond the commercial
area, Strasbourg Court decisions concerning family law and inheri-
tance may have an effect on domestic relations in the United States
involving a family with European and American members. Even deci-
sions on criminal law procedure (a major concern under Article 6 of
the Convention) may have some relevance for businesses involved in
international trade or operations.
In view of the useful, if not necessary, nature of this information
for a well educated American lawyer, this Article sets out a detailed
description of how the European Court of Human Rights operates
and discusses problems affecting the operation of the Court. This Arti-
cle, then, is partly descriptive and partly normative. 23 Part I describes
Terrorism, 28 FoRDHnm INT'L L.J. 392 (2005) (Judge Hedigan is the Irish member of the
Strasbourg Court.). However, though insightful, none of these articles are sufficiently com-
prehensive to fully describe the structure or problems of the Court. Thus, I have written
this Article to make up for the lack of materials available to American lawyers about the
Strasbourg Court.
21. And, obviously, it will be important if the Supreme Court continues to look to it
(and other foreign law) as a source of authority in constitutional interpretation, the issue
which has focused attention on the Strasbourg Court.
22. Justices Breyer and O'Connor have justified references to foreign law as being
useful sources of ideas when confronting intractable problems of interpretation. See Cleve-
land, supra note 3, at B4. Justice Stevens, in a recent speech justifying relying on foreign
law said: "If we expect them to listen to us, we should at least be willing to listen to what
they have to say to us."John Strauss, Justice's Speech, INDLANAPOLIS STAR, May 24, 2005, at 6A.
23. I have spent considerable time reading and analyzing many cases decided by the
Court in connection with a course I teach titled "Comparative Civil Liberties" that com-
pares developments in Europe and the United States in this area. I have also discussed the
operation of the Court with a number of people in Europe who have practiced before the
Court, have been close observers of the Court, or are or have been associated with the
Court. Some of the views expressed in this Article are based on discussions with people
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the history of the Strasbourg Court, and Part II describes the current
structure of the Court. Part III then discusses some jurisprudential
principles of the Strasbourg Court. Finally Part IV raises a number of
problems that will have major effects on the future operations of the
Court. Not everyone who is an observer of, or is associated with, the
Court may agree with all of the problems raised by this Article, but
these problems are ones with which, sooner or later, the Court (and,
in addition, the Council of Europe, its parent organization) must
grapple.
I. History of the European Court of Human Rights
Shortly after World War II, at the urging of Winston Churchill,
leaders of the victorious Western European countries initiated discus-
sions on creation of a pan-European organization that would protect
human rights and make a repeat of the ghastly war less likely.24 In
1948 a conference was organized in The Hague that led to the 1949
establishment of the Council of Europe. 25
The Council of Europe's governance is divided between two bod-
ies. 26 The Committee of Ministers, perhaps the most important, is
made up of the foreign minister (or the designee thereof) of each
member state.27 The other is the Parliamentary Assembly, which is
somewhat more proportional in its representation of the various
member states.28 The foremost of the Council's several goals is the
protection of human rights.29 Thus, one of its earliest actions was to
who practice before or are associated with the Court, and for various reasons this Article
does not identify them by name or position. Thus, some of the observations this Article
makes are not supported by verified footnote references, and the reader should take them
to simply be the Author's opinion on the subjects, though often derived from confidential
sources [hereinafter Confidential Sources].
24. About the Council, supra note 10; see also Winston Churchill, Address at Zurich
(Sept. 19, 1946), available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About__Coe/Discour-
sChurchill.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
25. CLARE OvEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE: EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HuMAN RIGHTS 2 (3d ed. 2002). The European Court of Human Rights website has a con-
cise history of the Court. See Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, The Court, http://
www.echr.coe.int/ (follow "The Court" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) [hereinafter
Court History].
26. Council Summary, supra note 9.
27. Id
28. Id.
29. Id.; About the Council, supra note 10. The Council now engages in a wide range of
activities, including (as a small sample) promotion of a social charter, facilitation of re-
gional environmental planning, protection of national minorities, protection of the family,
and even promotion of fair play in sports. Council of Eur., The Council of Europe, 800
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facilitate the drafting of the Convention and, once that was in effect,
to superintend its operation. 30
The draft of the Convention was completed in 1950 and became
effective in 1953 after it was ratified by ten governments. 31 The initial
provisions were modeled after the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights promulgated in 1948.32 The basic coverage of the Convention
can be seen by the titles to the substantive Articles providing for pro-
tection rights in two broad categories. The substantive provisions of
the Convention as it exists today are set out in the Appendices of this
Article. The first category deals with individual human rights-the
right to liberty, prevention of torture, and the right to a fair trial-as
provided for in Articles 2 through 7.33 The second category deals with
individual liberty-the right of privacy and freedom of religion, ex-
pression, and association-provided for in Articles 8 through 12.34 In
subsequent years, additional substantive protections were added by
protocols guaranteeing such matters as protection of property, free-
dom of movement, additional criminal law protections, and the aboli-
Million People, http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About Coe/Brochures/800millionsE.asp
(listing the Council's many activities).
30. Council Summary, supra note 9 (noting that the European Convention on Human
Rights was created in 1950).
31. Court History, supra note 25. In opinions by the Strasbourg Court, a country that
has ratified the Convention and thus can be a defendant before the Court is usually re-
ferred to as the "Contracting State." Id. In this Article, they will be referred to as a member
state. Only a member state can be a defendant in a case brought before the Court. I&
32. Id.
33. Convention, supra note 12, arts. 2-7. The titles of these articles are: Article 2,
Right to Life; Article 3, Prohibition of Torture; Article 4, Prohibition of Slavery and Forced
Labour; Article 5, Right to Liberty and Security; Article 6, Right to a Fair Trial; Article 7,
No Punishment Without Law. Id,
34. Id, arts. 8-12. The titles of these articles are: Article 8, Right to Respect for Private
and Family Life; Article 9, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion; Article 10, Free-
dom of Expression; Article 11, Freedom of Assembly and Association; Article 12, Right to
Marry. Id. Two other articles that might be characterized as substantive are: Article 13,
Right to an Effective Remedy and Article 14, Prohibition of Discrimination. Id. arts. 13-14.
An important aspect of Articles 8 through 11 is that, in addition to guaranteeing a particu-
lar freedom, each contains an express limitation on that freedom. Id. arts. 8-11. For exam-
ple, section 1 of Article 10 provides for freedom of expression, but section 2 limits it:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of na-
tional security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputa-
tion or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Id, art. 10.
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tion of the death penalty.3 5 Nevertheless, not all protocols have been
signed by every member state.3 6
The evolution of the Court has gone through three stages.3 7 In
the first stage, there was no Court, but only a European Commission
on Human Rights. 3 8 The Commission consisted of one member from
each country that had agreed to the Convention.39 An application 40 to
35. Council of Eur., Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/009.htm (providing for protection of property, the right to education, and the right
to free elections) [hereinafter Protocol 1]; Council of Eur., Protocol No. 4 to the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing certain
rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Convention and in the first
Protocol thereto, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/
046.htm (guaranteeing freedom of movement, prohibits imprisonment for debt, prohibits
expulsion of nationals, and prohibits collective expulsion of aliens) [hereinafter Protocol
4]; Council of Eur., Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, as Amended
by Protocol No. 11, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/
114.htm (abolishing the death penalty) [hereinafter Protocol 6]; Council of Eur., Protocol
No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/117.htm (providing
procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens, the right of appeal in criminal mat-
ters, compensation for wrongful conviction, the right not to be tried or punished twice,
and equality between spouses) [hereinafter Protocol 7]; Council of Eur., Protocol No. 12
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, availa-
ble at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/177.htm [hereinafter Proto-
col 12]; Council of Eur., Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all
circumstances, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/18 7 .htm
[hereinafter Protocol 13].
36. European Court of Human Rights, Dates of Ratification of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Additional Protocols, http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "Basic
Texts" hyperlink; then follow "Dates of Ratification of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Additional Protocols" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 19, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Ratification Dates]. Russia has not signed the protocol abolishing the death penalty;
two members, Andorra and Switzerland, have not signed Protocol 1; seven member states
have not signed Protocol 4, including Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; and
eight states, including Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom,
have not signed Protocol 7. Id.
37. The third stage (the current stage) will be modified somewhat in the next few
years, as is discussed infra Part IV.A.
38. ALASTAIR MOWBRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (2001) [hereinafter MOWBRAY Text].
39. Id.
40. An "application" is the technical term used in the Convention whenever someone
claims to be aggrieved by the action of a member state. Thus, it is the equivalent of a
complaint or a petition in the United States. A person who would be labeled as a plaintiff
or a petitioner in the United States is thus known as an "applicant" under the Convention
and this is the term used herein. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RULES OF COURT, R.
1(n) (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR (follow "Basic Texts" hyper-
link; then follow "Rules of Court" hyperlink) [hereinafter ECHR RULES].
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the Commission could be filed by any aggrieved individual or by a
member state, but only against a member state.41 If the Commission
found no violation of the Convention, it simply rejected the applica-
tion, and that particular case ended.42 But if the Commission found a
prima facie case that the Convention had been violated, it undertook
fact finding and attempted to reach a "friendly settlement."43 If such a
settlement failed, the Commission issued a report as to whether there
had been a violation of the Convention and detailed the reasons for
its finding.44 Such a report, by itself, had no binding effect. 45
In the earliest years, the enforcement of the finding of a violation
was carried out by the Committee of Ministers (which, as noted above,
is made up of the foreign minister-or his or her delegate-of each
member state) of the Council of Europe.46 The Committee of Minis-
ters could attempt to enforce the finding, or could choose to disre-
gard it.4 7 Enforcement was left to the Committee of Ministers because,
in the earliest years, the member countries were unwilling to take a
political element out of the adjudication process.48 If the Committee
of Ministers found that the violation should be enforced, it would at-
tempt to persuade the guilty member state to abide by the Commis-
sion's determination. 49 The Committee of Ministers had no direct
enforcement powers in the sense that a court in a sovereign country
would have. 50 It only had the power of persuasion or, at the last resort,
the power to expel the recalcitrant country from the Council of
Europe.5 1
41. Convention, supra note 12, art. 33. Applications for violations brought by another
member state have been very rare, the most notable being Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 25 (1978) (complaining about police and judicial procedures used in the effort
to quell illegal activities by the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland). Initially, an
individual could apply for relief only if a member state permitted such applications, but in
1990, the right to apply for relief by an individual had, as a practical matter, become unlim-
ited. MARKJANis ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, TEXT AND MATERIALS 23-26 (2d ed.
2000).
42. MoWBRAY Text, supra note 38, at 2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Council Summary, supra note 9.
47. MowBRAY Text, supra note 38, at 2.
48. Id. at 3-4; A.W. Brian Simpson, Britain and the European Convention, 34 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 523, 529 (2001).
49. OVEY & WHITE, supra note 25, at 435.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 431-35. The Committee of Ministers still has the same limited enforcement
powers even today. On one occasion a member state has withdrawn from the Council of
Europe. In 1967, a military junta overthrew the government of Greece and installed an
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In 1959, a second stage was implemented. Since the Committee
of Ministers rarely rejected a Commission finding, the member states
amended the Convention to take the Committee of Ministers out of
the substantive adjudication process by establishing the European
Court of Human Rights. 52 The Court, made up of one part-time judge
from each member state, was empowered to hear appeals from Com-
mission decisions. 53 Until 1990, an individual applicant had no inde-
pendent right to refer a case to the Court (i.e., appeal from a
Commission decision) and was, thus, entitled to a hearing only if the
Commission itself thought the matter should be further examined by
the Court.54 But, in 1990, the right to appeal to the Court was ex-
tended to unsuccessful applicants by the now superceded Protocol
9.55 If the Court found a violation, its decision was sent to the Commit-
tee of Ministers for enforcement. 56 After establishment of the Court,
the Committee of Ministers no longer had substantive powers. Rather,
the Committee of Ministers merely supervised the implementation of
the decisions-one of the roles it played since the inception of the
Convention.57
The two tier process described above (a Commission proceeding
and then a Court proceeding) created many problems. It was ex-
tremely expensive for parties to go through what were often, in effect,
two de novo hearings. The two hearings were also extremely time con-
suming, and cases might be in the decision making process for over a
decade without a resolution.58 The biggest problem, however, was the
authoritarian regime. Id, Hours before the Committee was to act on expulsion, the junta
withdrew from the Committee. Id. After democracy was restored in Greece in 1974, it was
re-admitted. Id. at 432-33. See alsojANIS FT AL., supra note 41, at 53-63. Recently the United
Kingdom considered (but rejected) a withdrawal from the European Court of Human
Rights because of decisions by the Strasbourg Court viewed as excessively protective of
illegal immigrants. See Philip Johnson, Blair to Take on Judges over Asylum, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Feb. 20, 2003, at 1, 1.
52. MOWBRAY Text, supra note 38, at 3-4 (noting that Commission findings were fol-
lowed "in most cases" and that "in a few cases" the Committee of Ministers was "unable to
reach a decision").
53. Id. at 2-3.
54. Id. at 2, 773 (providing the provisions of Protocol 9, which was repealed by Proto-
col 11, abolishing the Commission).
55. Id. at 774.
56. Id at 2.
57. OVEY & WHITE, supra note 25, at 420-36.
58. See, e.g., Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. Denmark, App. No. 49017/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Dec. 17, 2004), available at HUDOC search, supra note 2 (searching for App. No. "49017/
99") (noting that a libel case was filed in 1991, and was finally decided by the Grand Cham-
ber in 2004 finding Pedersen guilty of libel by a 10-9 vote); see also United Communist
Party of Turk. v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121 (1998) (There was
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vast increase in the caseload of the Commission and the Court result-
ing from an expanding number of countries joining the Conven-
tion-particularly those with a recent history of repression-and from
an increasing awareness by member state citizens of the possibility of
obtaining substantive relief. In 1990 there were 5279 initial applica-
tions filed with the Commission, and the then part-time Court ren-
dered only thirty judgments on appeal from the Commission.59 The
number of cases decided increased slowly over the succeeding years
until 1997, the last full year that the Commission was in existence,
when there were over 14,000 initial applications filed with the Com-
mission.60 That year the Court rendered 106 decisions on appeal from
the Commission. 6 1
In 1998, after many years of negotiations, a third stage in the
evolution of the Court became effective when the Convention was
amended to provide for a radical restructuring of the Court.62 The
Commission was abolished, and the Court was reconstituted with full-
time judges. 63 The new structure allows anyone (an individual or a
member state) to make an application directly to the Court itself for
any alleged violation of the Convention. 64
While the new Court began functioning in 1998, there was a con-
siderable transition period, and the now-abolished Commission did
not completely disappear until the year 2000.65 Thus, only since 2001
has the new Court been fully operational in its most recent form. Cur-
rently, a somewhat substantial revision of the third stage, known as
Protocol 14, has been adopted by the Council of Europe and is being
circulated amongst the member states.66 This revision will take effect
when member states ratify it.
almost eight years between a ban imposed on the party and a finding that the ban violated
the Convention.).
59. COUNCIL OF EUR., EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF AcTIVITIEs 2004,
at 35 (2004), http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "Reports" hyperlink; then follow "Survey of
Activities 2004" hyperlink) [hereinafter SURVEY OF AcTIVITIES 2004].
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. MowBRA Text, supra note 38, at 16-17, 778-88 (providing the text of Protocol 11,
which accomplished this amendment).
63. Id.
64. Convention, supra note 12, art. 34.
65. MowBRAv Text, supra note 38, at 17.
66. Council of Eur., Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention, May
13, 2004, available at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Word/194.doc
(last visited Sept. 3, 2004). [hereinafter Protocol 14]. This Article uses the term "somewhat
substantial" to indicate that the revision contained in Protocol 14 is viewed by the Court as
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E. The Current European Court of Human Rights
A. The Structure of the Court
1. Judges of the Court
The European Court of Human Rights, headquartered in Stras-
bourg, France, 67 draws judges from the signatories of the Conven-
tion-one judge from each member state, regardless of population.68
Relatively small countries, such as San Marino (population 27,000)
and Liechtenstein (population 33,000), each have one judge, while
larger countries such as Germany (population 83,000,000) and Russia
(population 145,000,000) similarly have only one judge each.69 Each
country nominates three persons to be ajudge, but the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe selects which nominee will serve.
70
Persons nominated must be of good character and have the qualifica-
tions that would allow them to hold "high judicial office" in the nation
nominating them.71
There has been criticism of the current process of choosing
judges. Some of this criticism has been directed at the member states
where, some suspect the three candidates nominated are not always
the best (and willing) candidates available to the member state, but
rather are simply politically well-connected.7 2 Some direct this criti-
cism toward the Council of Europe for not having sufficient safe-
guards for screening candidates. 73 Recently, the Assembly of the
more than a minor change in the operation of the Court. It does not, however, change the
basic structure of the Court or its functions. The main substantive differences will be de-
scribed in the next section, "The Structure of the Court." See discussion infra Part II.A.
67. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 19.
68. Convention, supra note 12, art. 20.
69. 2005 WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 7, at 778, 797, 823, 825 (Germany, Liechten-
stein, Russia, and San Marino, respectively).
70. Convention, supra note 12, art. 22 (failing to indicate any requirement that a
judge be a citizen of the country that nominated him or her); see also OvEY & WHrTE, supra
note 25, at 397.
71. Convention, supra note 12, art. 21; European Court of Human Rights, Organisa-
tion of the Court, http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "The Court" hyperlink; then follow "Or-
ganisation of the Court" hyperlink); European Court of Human Rights, Composition of
the Court, http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "The Court" hyperlink; then follow "Composi-
tion of the Court" hyperlink) [hereinafter Court Composition].
72. See, e.g., MowBRAV Text, supra note 38, at 19-20 (referencing a London Times arti-
cle criticizing the process by David Pannick, QC, Political Meddling in Rights Is Wrong, TIMES
(London), May 19, 1998, at 39).
73. See Henry G. Schermers, Election ofJudges to the European Court of Human Rights, 23
EUR. L. REv. 568, 574-75 (1998) (noting that the screening process by the Assembly has
been by use of ad hoc subcommittees, some members of which were not lawyers or other-
wise well acquainted with the Convention, and the screening has been carried out by re-
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Council passed Resolution 1366,74 placing more emphasis on the legal
qualifications of the candidates nominated and making it clear that
the Assembly was willing to reject the nominations made by a member
state if the nominees did not meet these criteria.75
Judges serve on a full time basis for a term of six years and can be
renominated at the end of each term. 76 Judges must retire, however,
upon reaching the age of seventy.77 A judge can be dismissed while
serving for misconduct by a vote of two-thirds of the judges of the
Court.78 Each judge receives an annual salary of C198,349 free from
income tax. 7 9 The Strasbourg Court conducts its proceedings in En-
glish and French (and the Convention and major opinions are pub-
viewing the curriculum vitae of the candidates and conducting a short personal interview
with little or no independent investigation of the candidates (Schermers was a member of
the now abolished Commission)). This criticism does not mean that the process of vetting
well qualified judges has been completely ineffectual. I have been told by close observers of
the Court that there have been instances where, privately, the Council has suggested to a
member state that all the judges it nominated were unqualified and that, unless more
qualified candidates were nominated, the nominees would be publicly rejected-and that
this has been successful maneuver. Confidential Sources, supra note 23.
74. COUNCIL OF EUR., PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 1366(2004), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/documents/adoptedtext/
ta04/eresl366.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) [hereinafter RESOLUTION 1366]. The Resolu-
tion was adopted on January 30, 2004. Id
75. Id. The resolution also announced that the Assembly would reject any list of nomi-
nations unless it contained at least one candidate of each sex. Id.
76. Convention, supra note 12, art. 23. Protocol 14 provides thatjudges may serve for
a single, nonrenewable, term of nine years. Protocol 14, supra note 66, art. 2. However, it
may be several years before this Protocol becomes effective.
77. Convention, supra note 12, art. 23. Protocol 14 retains this provision. Protocol 14,
supra note 66, art. 2.
78. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 7.
79. Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Resolution on the Status and Conditions of
Service of Judges of the European Court of Human Rights, 909th Meeting, Res. No. 50 (2004),
available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=803205&BackColorlnternet=9999CC&
BackColorlntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75. The President of the Court re-
ceives and additional C12,092 and the Presidents of Sections an additional C6,046. Id.
There is, however, no "employer paid" pension or retirement plan for judges. Id. The tax
free basis of the salary is provided for by Section 18 of the General Agreement on Privileges
and Immunities of the Council of Europe, adopted September 2, 1949 in Paris, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm. The value of the euro in the
past few years has fluctuated between $0.85 and $1.30, so the dollar equivalent has similarly
fluctuated. By comparison, the salary of an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court is $194,300, but the tax-free feature makes the European Court judges salaries con-
siderably higher as a practical matter (though this is offset to a degree by the lack of a
pension). 2005 WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 7, at 68.
Fall 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
lished in both languages), and judges must be fluent in one of these
languages and should have some facility with the other.80
Protocol 14, when it is adopted by the member states, will change
the term of the judges to a single nine-year nonrenewable term. 81
When this protocol was initially proposed, the Assembly of the Coun-
cil endorsed the change in the term of the judges in order "to ensure
the independence and impartiality of [the] judges. '8 2 This latter pro-
posal illustrates a concern that a judge might unwarrantedly begin
favoring the country that he or she represents in order to obtain
renomination.
Some close observers of the Court suggest the nomination and
retention concerns reflect unease with the political and economic dif-
ficulties existing in many of the more recent member states.83 In such
situations, it may be more likely that improper political considerations
may affect the initial choice of nominees. Economic concerns may af-
fect the desire of sitting judges from such countries to get renomi-
nated to the Court where the salary and benefits are far higher than
for lawyers or judges in his or her member state.84
2. Organization of the Court
The Court has an extremely complicated organization. It is inter-
nally divided into four geographically balanced 85 "Sections," and each
judge on the Court is assigned to one of the Sections.86 The Court as a
whole is administered by a President and two Vice Presidents, and the
80. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 34.1. While it is important that ajudge be fluent in
at least one of the languages, in some cases ajudge's facility with the other has been mini-
mal. The Court actually has language classes available for judges. Oral arguments are si-
multaneously translated into the language not being used by the litigants.
81. Protocol 14, supra note 66, art. 23.
82. Press Release, Council of Eur. Parliamentary Assembly, Reform of the European
Court of Human Rights: Assembly's Proposals (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://assem-
bly.coe.int/ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?CPID=1534&search= (last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
83. Confidential Sources, supra note 23.
84. I have not heard any criticism of any current member of the Court. Those who
have spoken to me have been concerned about the process but do not think, so far, un-
qualified candidates have been seated. In some of the former Iron Curtain countries, the
judges appointed-for example Karel Jungwiert of the Czech Republic-were leaders in
overthrowing Communist rule. Confidential Sources, supra note 23.
85. ECHR RuLEs, supra note 40, R. 25. They are also balanced as to gender. Id.
86. Convention, supra note 12, art. 26(b) (providing that the Court shall set up
"Chambers"); ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 25 (noting that Chambers shall be referred
to as "Sections" and that each judge shall be assigned to a Section); Court Composition,
supra note 71 (noting that the Court has set up four Sections, and noting the assignment of
judges).
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judges of the entire Court elect these officers.8 7 The Vice Presidents
also serve as Presidents of two of the Sections, and the judges elect a
President for the other two sections and a Vice President for each of
the four Sections.88 Each case filed in the Court is initially assigned to
one of the Sections.8 9
A Section has two functions.90 First, it decides whether a case as-
signed to it should be heard on its merits91-the term used is whether
the case is "admissible. '92 This is an important gatekeeping function,
and Sections reject a large majority of the applications for relief at an
early stage because the applications do not involve a violation of the
Convention, because domestic remedies have not been exhausted, or
because the application is not timely.93 A three-judge "committee"
performs almost all of this screening.94 Second, if the case is deemed
admissible, a seven judge "Chamber" of the Section decides whether
there has been a violation of the Convention. 95
Each Section normally has eleven or twelve assigned judges.96 A
Section is internally divided into three Chambers, each Chamber con-
87. Convention, supra note 12, art. 26.
88. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 8.
89. Id, R. 52.
90. Id. R. 53-56.
91. Id R. 53-54, 59.
92. Id
93. Convention, supra note 12, art. 35.
94. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 53. The most significant change contained in Pro-
tocol 14 is that most of this initial screening will be done by a single judge (aided by two
experienced staffers from the Registrar's office) instead of a three judge Committee. Pro-
tocol 14, supra note 66, arts. 24, 26-27. A single judge may declare an application inadmis-
sible. Id Another change that may also be fairly significant is Article 8 of Protocol 14,
providing for an amended Article 28, allowing a three-judge Committee (instead of a
seven-judge Chamber) to render a judgment on the merits of a case "if the underlying
question in the case, concerning the interpretation or the application of the Conven-
tion ... is already the subject of well-established case-law of the Court." Id art. 28. Finally,
Protocol 14 amends Article 35 to permit the Court to declare an application inadmissible
"where the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage," unless the issue has not
been duly considered by a tribunal of the defendant member state. Id. art. 11. The purpose
of these changes is an attempt to keep up with the enormous number of cases which have
been filed in the past few years by directing more judge time at deciding cases that have
been found to have merit and less judge time to the initial screening process. Council of
Eur., Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention, Explanatory Report,
CETS No. 194, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm
[hereinafter Explanatory Report, Protocol 14].
95. Convention, supra note 12, arts. 27, 29.
96. European Court of Human Rights, Composition of the Sections, http://
www.echr.coe.int/echr (follow "The Court" hyperlink; then follow "Composition of the
Sections" hyperlink).
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sisting of seven judges.97 The President of the Section serves on all
three Chambers, and each other judge of the section serves as a mem-
ber of two Chambers. 98 When a case is heard on the merits, it is usu-
ally assigned to a Chamber of the Section containing the judge from
the defendant state. 99 Each of the three Chambers sets up a Commit-
tee of three judges to carry out the functions assigned to a
Committee. 00
In addition to the four Sections, there is also a "Grand Chamber"
of the whole Court whose purpose is to hear further appeals from
decisions rendered by a Chamber of a Section. 1° 1 The Grand Cham-
ber consists of seventeen judges including the President of the Court,
the President of each Section, and twelve other judges of the Court.10 2
For purposes of selecting the twelve additional judges, the judges of
the Court are divided into two "groups," each consisting of half of the
judges of the Court (other than the Presidents).1°3 Each group "alter-
nates every nine months" in providing the remaining members of a
Grand Chamber, and the twelve additional judges for a Grand Cham-
ber case are selected from the group then available by rotation. 10 4
However, a Grand Chamber cannot include any judge who partici-
pated in the Chamber decision except for the President of the Court
or Section and the judge of the defendant member state.10 5 Any party
can request a redetermination by the Grand Chamber, and a Cham-
ber considering a case can recommend that a case be heard in a
97. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 26; see THREE YEARS' WORK FOR THE FUTURE-FINAL
REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON WORKING METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 33 (2002) [hereinafter WORKING METHODS REPORT] (detailing the Court's internal
organization).
98. See WORKING METHODS REPORT, supra note 97, at 61 (noting that the other Section
members sit in on Chamber deliberations in case they are needed as "substitute judges").
99. Id. at 62. Most cases are assigned to the Section with a judge from the defendant
state. But, if it has not been so assigned, if the case is heard on its merits by a Chamber of
the Section, the judge from that member state sits as an eighth member of the Chamber.
See infra notes 114, 128-29 and accompanying text (assignment of cases procedure).
100. WORKING METHODS REPORT, supra note 97, at 10. Judges are appointed to a Com-
mittee for a one year period. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 27. The President, however,
does not serve on a Committee. Id. In a Section with more than ten judges presumably one
judge is not burdened with Committee duties for a year.
101. Convention, supra note 12, art. 27(3).
102. Id. art. 27.
103. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 24.
104. Id.
105. Convention, supra note 12, art. 27. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text
(explaining why the judge for the defendant member state always serves as part of a Cham-
ber or a Grand Chamber).
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Grand Chamber even before it decides a case. 10 6 Nevertheless, there is
no right to have a case heard by the Grand Chamber. Rather it is
discretionary, and the Grand Chamber has a five-member screening
committee to decide whether a Grand Chamber appeal should be
granted-the membership of which is the President of the Court, the
Presidents of Sections other than the President of the Section that
initially dealt with the case, and one other judge, assigned by rota-
tion. 10 7 The stated criteria are that the appeal raises "serious questions
of interpretation" or "serious issues of general importance."'01 8 To
date, successful appeals to the Grand Chamber are fairly rare-for
example, only sixteen in 2004, which is less than three percent of the
cases decided by Chambers. 0 9
3. Filing an Application
Anyone who believes that he or she is aggrieved by a decision of a
member state can file an application." 0 It need not be filed by coun-
sel, and the initial application can be filed in a language used by any
member state."' When an application is filed with the Court, the Pres-
ident of the Court assigns the application to one of the four Sec-
tions.11 2 Within a Section there are four steps for dealing with a case.
Initially a case is assigned to one of the Section judges who serves as
"Rapporteur" to make a preliminary analysis of the case and recom-
mend whether it should be admissible."13
106. Convention, supra note 12, arts. 30, 43.
107. Id. art. 43; ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 24(5). The judge chosen by rotation
cannot have participated in the chamber decision. Id
108. Convention, supra note 12, art. 21.
109. See SURVEY OF Ac-rVTIEs 2004, supra note 59, at 32 (documenting, in 2004, sixteen
cases decided by The Grand Chamber and 800 Chamber decisions-equating to about two
percent).
110. Convention, supra note 12, art. 33.
111. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 34. After the case has been communicated to the
member state that is the subject of the Application, further submissions must be in either
French or English unless leave is granted to continue using the initial application lan-
guage. Id.
112. Id. R. 51. Given the huge volume of cases, one would imagine that assignments of
cases to Sections are not done by the President personally, but merely under his general
supervision. The criteria used include balancing the workload of each Section and, to the
degree feasible, assigning a case to the Section to which the judge of the member state is
assigned. Id. R. 52. For member states from which there are large numbers of cases, this
cannot always be done without creating very unbalanced workloads.
113. Id. R. 49.
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The Rapporteur is often the judge for the member state against
whom the applicant is complaining. 114 In reality, one or more of the
lawyers in the Registrar's Office 1 5 performs most of the outset screen-
ing and then makes a report to the Rapporteur. 116 The second step is
for the Rapporteur to refer the case with his or her recommendations
to a three judge Committee who will decide if it is "admissible."" 7 A
Committee, by unanimous vote, can reject the case based simply on
the application's pleadings and need not state any reasons." 8
Unless a Committee rejects it by unanimous vote, the third step is
referral to a seven judge Chamber.' 19 The Chamber determines by a
majority vote whether it is inadmissible or admissible. 120 A Chamber
determines whether an application is inadmissible without a hearing,
114. WORKING METHODS REPORT, supra note 97, at 37. The reason for this is that deci-
sions and other documents of the member state courts are in that state's language, and
review of these documents is often necessary to determine if there is a basis for the claim
and, indeed, whether the application is timely. Further, initial applications need not be in
French or English, but may be in the language of the applicant. Thus, in most cases, only a
judge fluent in the member state language can efficiently evaluate these documents. Id.
115. See infra Part II.A.6 (discussing legal staff of the Strasbourg Court).
116. The WORKING METHODS REPORT outlines the method used for processing initial
applications-indicating that the Registrar's office prepares a "draft decision" that is then
given to the Rapporteur for review. WORKING METHODS REPORT, supra note 97, at 76-79.
Based on the statistical information contained in SURVEY OF ACTrVITIES 2004, supra note 59,
at 35, most judges would need to be the Rapporteur for over 700 cases each year. Id. (esti-
mate attained by dividing the number of cases by the number ofjudges). In addition, each
judge sitting on a Committee will consider the admissibility of more than 1700 cases each
year (many of which may be cases for which he or she was Rapporteur, however) and, of
course, will be part of a Chamber rendering ajudgment on approximately 110 cases a year.
Further, there may be a period of service on a Grand Chamber. A judge does all of this
without any personal law clerks. There are also various administrative committees of the
Court upon which judges serve, which may take varying amounts of time. It is not clear
what will happen to the Rapporteur function when Protocol 14 is eventually implemented,
which will allow a single judge to perform most initial screening of cases for "admissibility."
See Protocol 14, supra note 66. Perhaps the Rapporteur function will be subsumed as part
of the single judge position.
117. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 49 (noting that the Rapporteur can bypass a Com-
mittee if he or she thinks a case is likely to be "admissible" and refer it directly to a seven
judge Chamber). Obviously, when Protocol 14 is adopted, the referral of what appears to
be an "admissible" application will be made by the single judge who initially considers the
case either to a Committee or to a Chamber.
118. Convention, supra note 12, art. 28; ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 53. A Commit-
tee will consider approximately seventy reccommendations submitted by Rapporteurs at
each session-and there are about two sessions per month. SeeWORKING METHODS REPORT,
supra note 97, at 10 (indicating sessions once each fortnight, and seventy decisions each
session for each committee). The Committees of at least one Section do not even meet to
consider a Rapporteur recommendation unless one Committee member objects to the
recommendation. Id. at 79.
119. Convention, supra note 12, art. 29.
120. Id. art. 45.
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but must give a reason.121 If a Committee or Chamber deems an appli-
cation inadmissible, the case ends. 122 Historically, Committees and
Chambers deemed over eighty percent of the applications assigned to
a Section "inadmissible," and this percentage has risen substantially in
recent years.123
The fourth step occurs if the Chamber deems the application ad-
missible. Such a finding permits further briefing and factual submis-
sions,1 24 and the Chamber then decides whether there has been a
violation of the Convention. 125 Legal aid is also available from the
Court at this stage for applicants unable to retain a lawyer though the
amount of compensation allowed is very modest. 126 While cases are
being briefed and considered on their merits, the Office of the Regis-
trar may conduct settlement negotiations. 127
4. Hearing a Case
When a case is considered on the merits, the judge from the de-
fendant state always serves as a member of the Chamber or Grand
Chamber considering the case (even if the judge is not otherwise a
member of the Chamber or the Section).128 The reason for this is not
to provide favoritism to the state involved-indeed, an express provi-
121. Id.; ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 56.
122. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 53. This rule applies to inadmissibility decisions
made by Committees. There is no express rule dealing with the finality of inadmissibility
decisions made by a Chamber persuant to ECHR Rule 54, but the only possibility of further
consideration is a "referral" to a Grand Chamber persuant to Article 43 of the Convention,
and a "referral" is only allowed as to judgments. Convention, supra note 12, art. 43. Article
45 of the Convention distinguishes between "judgments" and decisions on admissibility,
and ajudgment is rendered only after a case has been "admitted" for consideration. Id art.
45; see also MOWBRAY Text, supra note 38, at 18 (showing a distinction between admissibility
decisions and judgments).
123. SURVEY OF AcrivITIEs 2004, supra note 59, at 35. In 2004, 96% of the applications
were not admitted (21,181 applications were considered by the Court, and 830 (4%) were
declared "inadmissible"). Id at 35, 37.
124. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 54.
125. Convention, supra note 12, art. 45. Judgments are made by written opinion. ECHR
RULES, supra note 40, R. 74 (detailing what must be contained in the text of ajudgment). A
Chamber has the authority to decide both the admissibility of the application and enter a
judgment on the merits at the same time. Id. R. 54A.
126. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 91-96. The Registrar promulgates the rates. Id. R.
95. The rates in force as ofJanuary 2004 were quite modest, for example C337 to prepare
an initial case plus C61 for secretarial expenses. KAREN REID, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 621 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter REID, PRAC-
TITIONER'S GUIDE]. If the Court requests additional briefing, some additional modest fees
are available. Id.
127. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 62.
128. Convention, supra note 12, art. 27(2).
Fall 20051 HUMAN RIGHTS COURT
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
sion of the Convention is thatjudges must be independent and impar-
tial-but a desire to have expertise in the domestic law of the state
available to the panel, because it may well play a critical role in the
outcome of any case. 129 In the rare circumstance that ajudge from the
defendant state is disqualified or otherwise unavailable, a temporary
judge appointed from the defendant states sits for the matter.130
Though the Court is an "appellate" court, it sometimes needs to
make factual determinations. It is not well set up for this task when it
becomes necessary, however, because it has no "lower" court to re-
mand matters for any necessary fact finding and because the eviden-
tiary rules of the Court are rudimentary. A short set of rules permit a
Chamber to "adopt any investigative measure which it considers capa-
ble of clarifying the facts of the case." 13 1 It further permits a Chamber
to receive documentary evidence and to "hear... a witness or expert"
whose evidence "seem[s] likely to assist it in carrying out its tasks. '13 2
Finally, one or more members of the Court can be deputized to "con-
duct an inquiry, carry out an investigation on the spot, or take evi-
dence in some other manner."133 There is no provision in the Court
proceedings carried out in Strasbourg for the cross-examination of a
witness or other methods of testing the reliability of contested facts.
The Court has, on a handful of occasions, deputized members of the
Court to conduct an investigation of the facts in the member state, but
such investigations are very costly in terms of judicial time and may
129. OVEY & WHITE, supra note 25, at 398.
130. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 29. This happens occasionally in cases involving
the United Kingdom since its judge, Sir Nicholas Bratza-President of one of the Sections
and certainly one of the most respected members of the court-was, for many years in the
past, the attorney for the United Kingdom in numerous cases, a few of which have some
relation to current cases. As a result, there was a substitute British judge for him in Hatton.
Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28, 611 (2003) (Grand
Chamber decision) (noting Sir Brian Kerr as an "ad hoc judge").
131. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. Al.l.
132. Id
133. Id R. AI.3.
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not be very useful. 134 When conducting an inquiry or an investigation,
witnesses can be examined by parties.' 13 5
Critics cite this lack of "independent" fact finding by the Court as
allowing member state courts to find facts in a way favorable to the
state without fear of independent verification.1 36 While there may be
some basis for such criticism, it is hard to imagine how the Court
could make determinations about hotly contested factual assertions
without developing a fact finding mechanism similar to that of a trial
court. As will be discussed in more detail later,137 the forty-six judges
of the Court are unable to keep up with the current caseload, and
having judges regularly conduct on-site investigations would make the
task of managing the caseload far worse. Further, it is unclear exactly
how the Court evaluates the affidavits or other evidence presented to
it, a topic discussed further in Part II.B.3.
The rules provide for the possibility of oral argument in cases
being decided by the Court. 3 8 Nonetheless, in recent years, very few
cases-only about three dozen per year-have been set for oral argu-
ment. 39 The Court has never set out any criteria for deciding if an
134. Id. Some of these investigations have been in connection with complaints from
Kurdish people against Turkey. A person connected with the Court told me that in one
investigation the witnesses spoke in a dialect to a Kurdish interpreter who, in turn, re-
ported what was said to a Turkish interpreter who, in turn, translated into English. Not
only was it time consuming, but there was substantial question as to whether the informa-
tion provided in English was, in fact, a true account of what the witnesses said. Experiences
such as this have caused at least some members of the Court to be skeptical of the value of
on-site investigations. See Marie-Benedicte Dembour, "Finishing Off' Cases: The Radical Solu-
tion to the Problem of the Expanding ECHR Caseload, 2002 EUR. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 604, 618
(2002) (reporting that "the Court restricts its fact finding to exceptional cases").
135. Id. R. A7; REID, PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 126, at 13-14. While the Court
has a provision allowing the Registrar to summon witnesses, it has no means to enforce it
other than asking the member state in which the investigation is occurring to carry it out.
ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. A5. Presumably an applicant who is being afforded an
investigation would have to inform the Court of the witnesses who should be heard.
136. See, e.g., Pietro Sardaro, Jus Non Dicere for Allegations of Serious Violations of Human
Rights: Questionable Trends in the Recent Case Law of the Strasbourg Court, 2003 EUR. HUM. RTs.
L. REv. 601, 618-20 (2003) (arguing that the Court must conduct many more on site inves-
tigations to prevent courts of member states from obfuscating the factual record to prevent
a successful appeal to the Strasbourg Court); Dembour, supra note 134, at 618-20.
137. See infta Part IV.A and accompanying text.
138. Convention, supra note 12, art. 40; ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 63.
139. See, e.g., European Court of Human Rights, Pending Cases, http://
www.echr.coe.int/ (follow "Pending Cases" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 13, 2005) (indicat-
ing that as of September 7, 2005, thirteen hearings are scheduled for September through
December 2005, suggesting a rate of about three dozen cases per year since the Court does
not hear cases in July and August). A substantial number of these are arguments before the
Grand Chamber. A Chamber of a Section may have only a handful of arguments each year
out of hundreds of cases decided.
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oral argument is required, but one practitioner before the Court has
suggested that it is done primarily in cases where the Court is likely to
rule against one of the member states.140 The arguments tend to be
little more than speeches on the part of the opposing counsel with
few, if any, questions interposed by judges during the presentations.14 1
After the initial arguments, members of the Court may pose a few
questions, but the oral argument process usually bears little compari-
son with, for example, arguments before the United States Supreme
Court. One reason for this somewhat ritualistic approach is that all
arguments are simultaneously translated into either English or
French, and Court rules urge counsel to submit, in advance, a copy of
their presentations to facilitate the translation. 142 As a practical mat-
ter, this rule has the ultimate effect of discouraging material deviation
from what has been submitted.143
Opinions are issued simply in the name of the Court-with no
indication of the judge who might be the author.144 The judges who
participated in deciding the case are named, however, and, unlike the
practice in the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Rules of
the Court permit concurring and dissenting opinions and list the
names of the judges who write or join such opinions. 145 Thus, it is
possible to determine which judges joined the opinion of the Court
without reservation.
5. Caseload of the Court
Though it is clear that the structural reform adopted in 1998 has
increased the efficiency of the Court, the Court has been swamped by
thousands of cases in the last few years. This current backlog of pend-
ing cases hampers the Court's ability to reach effective decisions or to
maintain the timeliness and quality of its jurisprudence.1 46 This enor-
140. Confidential Sources, supra note 23.
141. This is based both on personal experience and observations of others close to the
Court. Confidential Sources, supra note 23; see also Dembour, supra note 134, at 620 (agree-
ing that arguments at hearings tend to repeat what has already been submitted in writing,
though she regrets that oral arguments have become so rare).
142. REID, PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 126, at 12-13.
143. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
144. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 74 (indicating that the names of the judges shall
be listed, and allowing for concurring and dissenting opinions, but no lead author is
listed).
145. Id.
146. SURVEY OF ACYIVITIES 2004, supra note 59, at 35. The problems caused by this huge
increase of cases and the response of the Court, and its parent the Council of Europe, will
be more thoroughly discussed infra Part IV.A.
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mous increase in filings is due, in part, to the greater number of mem-
ber states. But, more importantly, the greater understanding by the
public and lawyers about the remedies available from the Court has
resulted in increased applications for relief.
Another likely factor in the increasing number of cases is that the
Court has asserted jurisdiction over many matters that might not ini-
tially have been thought to be covered by the Convention. For exam-
ple, in Hatton v. United Kingdom,147 a Chamber of the Court held that
England had violated Article 8 of the Convention (the right of pri-
vacy) by allowing noisy late night commercial airline flights over resi-
dential areas near Heathrow Airport. 148
Another example of where the Court has exercised jurisdiction
over matters is in the application of Article 6 (the right to a fair trial)
in many situations concerning the details of the criminal procedure
systems of the various member states. 149 In this, the jurisprudence is
beginning to resemble the habeas corpus jurisprudence in the United
States whereby federal courts review whether state court criminal trials
have complied with the United States Constitution.150 Based on an
unscientific survey of recently decided cases (the Court statistics do
not report this information directly), many Court decisions deal with
alleged violations of Article 6, which provides for fair trials in criminal
cases, and a substantial number of these Article 6 cases are decided
without published opinions.15 1 Many of these Article 6 cases come
147. App. No. 36022/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2001). Subsequently, the Grand Cham-
ber took jurisdiction of the case and although it rejected the Article 8 argument by a nar-
row margin, it did find a violation of Article 13, the lack of an adequate domestic remedy
for those vexed by airplane noise. See Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, 37
Eur. H.R. Rep. 28 (2003) (Grand Chamber decision). This is a curious result if, as the
Court held, there is no Article 8 violation. One completely unstated possibility is that the
Court might well find an Article 8 violation if in the future domestic law does not ade-
quately deal with the problem. The Court regards the Convention as an evolving document
and has, on several occasions, reversed previous holdings because of changed conditions.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
148. Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 26 (2001).
149. Convention, supra note 12, art.6.
150. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255 (2000). See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the many
cases decided under Articles 2, 3, 5, and 7, which also involve issues that often resemble
habeas corpus cases in the United States).
151. SURVEY OF ACTrVITIES 2004, supra note 59, at 13-16. I use the term "published" to
mean that the case is made available in print in a reporter such as the ECHR Reports. All
decisions of the Court are available on the Court's website. See European Court of Human
Rights, European Court of Human Rights Portal, HUDOC, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkpl97/search.asp?skin=HUdoc-en. Many decisions, especially recently, are only in a single
language-for example, many cases from Italy dealing with the single issue of trial delay
under Article 6 are only in French.
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from Turkey and involve Kurdish separatists. 15 2 Hundreds of these
cases have been from Italy because congestion in the Italian court sys-
tem can result in such long delays in bringing cases to trial that a
violation of Article 6 can be claimed. 153
The President of the Court has continually expressed considera-
ble concern that the Court is unable to keep up with the growing
backlog of cases. 154 Protocol 14, which was adopted by the Council of
Europe and is now circulating for approval from the member states, is
intended to improve the ability of the Court to process its caseload
fairly and efficiently.1 55 It is not clear that even these amendments will
be more than a palliative. 156
6. Legal Staff of the Strasbourg Court
The Court is served by a Registrar and two Deputy Registrars,
and, in addition, each Section has its own Registrar.15 7 The Registrars
and Deputy Registrars are elected by the judges of the Court. 58 The
Registrar's Office not only serves as the "clerk of the court," but it also
has a number of other functions. It serves as liaison between the Court
and various member countries, 159 and it conducts mediation between
applicants and defendant states with a goal of reaching a "friendly set-
tlement" without further action from the Court. 60 Perhaps the most
152. SURVEY OF ACTVITIEs 2004, supra note 59, at 13-16.
153. MOWBRAY Text, supra note 38, at 307 (indicating the state that has been found to
be in breach of the reasonable time guarantee most frequently is Italy); Dembour, supra
note 134, at 620 (indicating that Italy was the principle state accused in respect of "lengthy
procedures").
154. See, e.g., Luzius Wildhaber, President of the European Court of Human Rights,
Address at the High Level Seminar on the Reform of the European Human Rights System
2 (Oct. 18, 2004), transcript available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ [hereinafter Wildhaber,
Oslo Speech] (follow "Press" hyperlink; then follow "Speeches of the President of the
Court" hyperlink; then follow "Oslo, 18 October 2004" hyperlink) ("Since 1998 the back-
log is growing inexorably.")
155. Protocol 14, supra note 66; Wildhaber, Oslo Speech, supra note 154, at 2; Explana-
tory Report, Protocol 14, supra note 94; see also infta note 346 (setting out the figures show-
ing the enormous scope of the problem).
156. Protocol 14, supra note 66; Wildhaber, Oslo Speech, supra note 154, at 1-2; see
Alastair Mowbray, European Convention on Human Rights: Report of the Evaluation Group and
Recent Cases, 2 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 127, 129 (2002); see also infra Part IV.
157. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 15-18.
158. Id R. 15-16.
159. European Court of Human Rights, Role of the Registry, http://www.echr.coe.int/
(follow "The Court" hyperlink; then follow "Role of the Registry" hyperlink) [hereinafter
Registry Role] (noting, additionally, that the Registrar's staff also provides training for the
courts of new member states on the operation of the Strasbourg Court and the standards
enforced by it).
160. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 62.
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important duty of the Registrar's Office, however, is to serve as the
legal staff for the judges since the judges of the Court have no per-
sonal law clerks. 1
6 1
The Registrar's legal staff is quite large, with approximately 205
attorneys at the present time. 162 Except for the Registrars and Deputy
Registrars, the staff, including the legal staff, is appointed by the Sec-
retary General of the Council of Europe in consultation with the Presi-
dent of the Court or his designee.1 63 The need for a large legal staff is
no surprise for anyone familiar with appellate courts in the United
States,1 64 but there are some significant differences.
First, in the United States a judge and the law clerks hired by him
or her develop an individual relationship that usually reflects the pri-
orities (and even the biases) of the judge. In the Strasbourg Court,
however, the Registrar's staff is answerable to the Registrar, 65 and not
161. Registry Role, supra note 159. When Protocol 14 becomes effective, a staff of "rap-
porteurs" (presumably senior members of the legal staff) will also be created to assist a
judge "sitting in a single-judge formation" in deciding whether a case should be deemed
inadmissible. Protocol 14, supra note 66, art. 4. Such rapporteurs would have no say in the
final decision on admissibility so, in effect, they would be operating as senior law clerks. Id&
162. See Registry Role, supra note 159. A lawyer in any of the member states is eligible to
be employed as a staff attorney and job descriptions describing openings for vacant senior
positions will sometimes specify that the applicant must be fluent in a particular language
(e.g., Lithuanian) as well as being able to speak and write fluently in either English or
French. European Court of Human Rights, The Registry, Employment, http://
www.echr.coe.int/ (follow "The Court" hyperlink; then follow "Employment" hyperlink;
then follow the "Current Vacancies" hyperlink; then follow the "Vacant Permanent Post")
(last visited Sept. 21, 2005) (listing vacant positions, however, when last visited, no open
staff attorney positions were posted). (There are a total of thirty-seven official languages in
the various countries which are signatories to the Convention. WORKING METHODS REPORT,
supra note 97, at 11.) Whether a disproportionate number of the legal staff are from En-
glish or French speaking countries (the two official languages of the Court) is not con-
tained in any information provided by the Court.
163. European Court of Human Rights, The Registry, Employment, http://
www.echr.coe.int/ (follow "The Court" hyperlink; then follow "Employment" hyperlink)
(noting that the Council of Europe handles all employment for personnel of the Court).
In addition to the legal staff of the Registrar's Office, it provides the necessary clerical staff,
translators, and security officers for the Court. See Registry Role, supra note 159.
164. For example, United States Supreme Court Justices have three law clerks apiece,
who, generally speaking, serve for one term. Each justice on the California Supreme Court
has at least five law clerks (known as "research attorneys" who are usually permanent
clerks) as well as a substantial "central staff." See CALIF. SUPREME COURT, THE SUPREME
COURT OF CALIFORNIA 4 (2003), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/
documents/supreme2003-1 .pdf.
165. See Registry Role, supra note 159. Or perhaps, at least as a technical matter, to the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe. To what degree the decision making regard-
ing staff is delegated by the Secretary General to the Registrar is unknown to the author.
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to individual judges. 166 The Registrar's staff prepares the initial analy-
sis of all cases, is present in Chamber deliberations, 67 and probably
prepares most opinions of the Court. What effect this relationship has
on the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court is impossible for an out-
sider to know. For some judges the effect may well be minimal or non-
existent. But it is possible that the staff views might have an effect on
new judges or judges not entirely comfortable with the English or
French language. 168 Extensive use of a central legal staff may also re-
sult in greater bureaucratic or institutional decision-making. 69
Second, in part, the legal staff (serving as the equivalent of an
American law clerk) does carry out duties typical of the position, such
as an analysis of each application filed with the Court as to whether it
should be admissible because the allegations suggest that there has
been a violation of the Convention. 70 But the duties go further. Pur-
166. The Registrar, and thus the legal staff indirectly, is answerable to the Court as a
whole, but that is a considerably different relationship than between ajudge and his or her
own law clerk.
167. See Registry Role, supra note 159.
168. It is too soon to know what the average length of service will be of a judge, since
the first full term for any of the currentjudges did not expire until 2004. Some, but not all,
were reelected. See European Court of Human Rights, Press Release, Election ofJudges to
the European Court of Human Rights (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2004/April/Electionofudges-April2004.htm. The term is for
six years and is renewable, though it takes renomination by the judge's country and accept-
ance of the renomination by the Council of Europe, and in any event, judges must retire at
age seventy. Certainly some judges will serve for many years, but many others may serve for
no more than one or two terms. Novice judges may well be more likely to be influenced in
subtle ways by the legal staff. This is merely an inference, but it does seem to be a situation
not dissimilar to that often thought to exist in British Civil Service. The cabinet ministers
who serve as heads of departments are members of Parliament and are supposed to make
all policy. But, they are often in charge for only a short time, with the result that the senior
permanent civil service "mandarins" often have great influence. This has been parodied in
two popular British television sitcoms, "Yes, Minister" and "Yes, Prime Minister." See The
Yes (Prime) Minister Files, Home Page, http://www.yes-minister.com/ (last visited Nov. 1,
2005). I do not mean to suggest that the situation at the Strasbourg Court-or even in
Britain-comes even close to the events parodied in these sitcoms.
169. Recently, a judge of the European Court of First Instance of the European Court
of Justice made such a complaint in a French legal journal against the legal staff of that
Court. John W. Miller & Mary Jacoby, EUJudge Hearing Microsoft's Appeal May Be Dismissed,
WALL ST.J.,June 21, 2005, at B3. The judge "attacked the legal clerks who assist the judges.
He called them 'ayatollahs' and accused them of using their inside knowledge of court
procedures and of French, the court language, to manipulate outcomes and inflate their
power." Id. The President of the Court has proposed that the judge be "dismissed" from
the Court for having attacked the legal staff. Id. I have no reason to think that similar
circumstances exist at the Strasbourg Court, but a centralized staff has more potential for
such an abuse than a system where law clerks are answerable to each individual judge.
170. Council of Eur., Directorate of Human Resources, http://www.coe.int/t/e/
Humanresources/Jobs/01_General_Information/ (showing some of the range of duties
[Vol. 40
HUMAN RIGHTS COURT
suant to Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar or his designee is
present during deliberations of a Committee, Chamber, or Grand
Chamber. 71 The rules provide that "only judges shall take part in the
deliberations,"' 72 but it is not hard to imagine that many questions
may well be put to the Registrar or other legal staff present, and thus
the responses of staff constitute a de facto participation. 73
Another aspect to the involvement of the Registrar's office also
deals with drafting opinions. All opinions are either in English or
French, and opinions of any consequence have usually been in both
languages. 174 The Court has a staff of professional interpreters so
translation of an opinion originally written in English into French (or
vice versa) is easily accomplished.1 75 But, of the more than forty-six
of the legal staff of the Registrar's Office). "Trainee lawyers" are limited to work, including
legal research, on correspondence and drafts concerning straightforward cases (such as
cases where a lead case has already determined the major legal principles or cases likely to
be found inadmissible by a Committee). Council of Europe, Instruction on the Organiza-
tion of the Work of Assistant and Junior Lawyers at the Registry of the European Court of
Human Rights, http://www.coe.int/t/e/Human-Resources/Jobs/08_Current-vacancies/
2_Vacant-temporary-posts/ACJurisnstructionTravail E.asp. A trainee lawyer may never
have "primary responsibility" for a case and may not attend deliberations by a Committee
or Chamber without a supervisor in attendance. Id& "Assistant lawyers" are allowed to deal
with somewhat more complex cases and may even be given responsibility for simple cases
and may attend deliberations of and "present cases" to a Committee or Chamber without
direct supervision. Id, There are no job descriptions available for more senior lawyers, re-
ferred to as "career lawyers" (that is, lawyers who have been recruited on category-A con-
tracts of indefinite duration) except that they, at minimum handle more complex cases,
are assigned cases, and attend deliberations of the Court and "present cases." They also
supervise trainee and assistant lawyers. Id. At one time, if it appeared on the face of the
application that there was no basis for jurisdiction in the Court, the Registrar's Office
would contact the applicant and suggest that the application be withdrawn. OVEY & WHITE,
supra note 25, at 400. The suggestion of no merit by the Registrar's Office had no legal
significance but apparently it did result in some cases being withdrawn. Id. This practice,
however, is no longer carried out. Id.
171. ECHR RutEs, supra note 40, R. 22. Rule 22 also provides that "other officials of the
Registry and interpreters whose assistance is deemed necessary" may also be present during
deliberations. Id. In the United States Supreme Court, law clerks never participate in con-
ferences, and such a practice is extremely rare in the California Supreme Court.
172. Id. R. 22(2).
173. The job description for attorneys set forth, supra note 170, expressly states that
attorneys "present cases" to Committees or Chambers.
174. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 76. Since 2002, most of the judgments have been
in either French or English, unless the Court decided otherwise. Presumably, many of
these are opinions in cases that are repetitive in terms of already clearly established case
law, where lack of translation does little harm in terms of making the case law of the Court
widely available. But, in some instances, those written only in English at least deal with
issues seemingly having some precedential significance because of factual variations. The
lack of dual language opinions may be a matter of lack of sufficient budget to translate
except in very important cases.
175. See Registry Role, supra note 159.
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judges on the Court, two have English as a native language, 176 and
probably not more than five have French as a native language. 177
While judges are supposed to be fluent in one of the two languages,
spoken fluency in a language and the ability to write with precision in
that language are not the same things. 178 A few non-native English or
French speaking judges may have the requisite skill to write with suffi-
cient accuracy in one of the Court's official languages, 179 but probably
a substantial number ofjudges do not. The consequence of this is that
opinions of the Court are likely drafted by the legal staff of the Regis-
trar's Office 1 8 0-to conform to the decisions reached by the judges.
Nonetheless, in such cases it would still be the product of the legal
staff, not the judges, and it may be that the nuances of such opinions
reflect to some degree the unconscious predilections of the staff
rather than the precise intention of the Court. 181 By necessarily hav-
176. This refers to the judges from Ireland and the United Kingdom. Of course, it is
possible that another member state judge is a native English speaker.
177. The judge from France obviously would be a native French speaker as would the
judge from Monaco. The judge from Andorra is likely to be fluent in French (though
Catalan is the official language). The judges from Belgium and Switzerland might be na-
tive French speakers (if from the French speaking parts of those two countries), and, even
if not, they are likely to have learned and used French extensively in the course of a domes-
tic legal career. While there may be more native French speakers than English speakers, it
is likely that a substantial majority of judges who are not native speakers of either language
are substantially more fluent in English than in French.
178. To be "conversant" in a language not one's own does not mean that a person
understands all subtleties of the language. See, e.g., Babel's Children, ECONoMIST, Jan. 10,
2004, at 69, 69 (discussing studies on how different structures in language-tenses, gender,
lack of clear distinction between nouns and verbs, etc.-have effects not understood by
someone not completely fluent in a language, and that this may actually affect the way
people think).
179. Some universities in northern continental Europe use English for some classroom
instruction. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, In Europe, Some Fear National Languages Are Endangered,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 2001, at Al. In the Netherlands there was a proposal a few years ago
that all university teaching be in English. Id. A number of continental European compa-
nies, including Alcatel (French), id., Siemens (German), and Credit Suisse now use En-
glish as the official corporate language at management levels. John Tagliabue, In Europe,
Going Global Means, Alas, English, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2002, at 15. A European Union Survey
released in 2001 reported that half of the citizens of the Union (including 40% from non-
English speaking countries) "believe" that they are conversant in English. Daley, supra, at
Al. But as observed, supra note 178, being "conversant" in a language is not the same as
being able to write fluently and with precision in that language.
180. See Registry Role, supra note 159 (mentioning "drafting" as a duty of the Regis-
trar's office).
181. This is only speculation on my part, although I have been told by two persons
close to the Court that lack of language proficiency is not an unusual problem. Confiden-
tial Sources, supra note 23. The same complaint-opinions being drafted by law clerks-
can be made about United States courts where judges have several law clerks. Certainly,
many United States opinions are, in fact, drafted by staff. But there are two significant
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ingjudges from many non-English or non-French speaking countries,
the involvement of the legal staff in drafting opinions seems to be an
inevitable consequence of the structure of the Strasbourg Court.
B. Remedies Available from the Court
1. The Primary Remedy Is Declaratory Relief
In terms of remedies, the Court is essentially restricted, with two
limited exceptions, to declaratory judgments. The Court can only de-
clare that a member state either has or has not breached the Conven-
tion in carrying out, or failing to carry out, the activity specified by the
application. 182 The Court has no jurisdiction to grant equitable de-
crees such as injunctions or similar remedial devices, and it has no
direct power to enforce its judgments-by contempt proceedings or
otherwise. Thus, the Court does not possess the many equitable pow-
ers available to courts in the United States (or the United Kingdom
for that matter) such as those used, for example, in cases involving
school desegregation and prison reform.
As noted earlier, it is up to the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe to obtain compliance with any judgment of the
Court finding a member state has transgressed the Convention. 183 To
date, member states have honored the judgments of the Court, al-
though in some instances with considerable delay and sometimes very
narrowly.' 84 The only truly coercive sanction the Council of Europe
has is threat of expulsion of the recalcitrant state. 185 There are only
two limited exceptions beyond the declaratory power. First, in some
circumstances the Court can request that the status quo be main-
tained pending the decision by the Court.186 Second, the Court can
grant 'just satisfaction"-monetary awards in somewhat limited cir-
differences. First, the law clerk who drafts an opinion works personally for the judge under
the judge's personal supervision (and, in terms of longterm staff-common in many
courts, though not in the United States Supreme Court-may be almost an alter ego of the
judge), and second, the United States judge is equally fluent in English and, thus, is in a
better position to spot nuances which might subtly alter or modify the intended meaning.
182. Convention, supra note 12, art. 46 (indicating that the judgment shall be transmit-
ted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution, but failing to indi-
cate in this article or any other article of the Convention what happens to the judgment
after this-thus implying declaratory judgment as the Court's primary remedy).
183. Id. art. 46.
184. Council of Eur., Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights, http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human-rights/execution/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).
185. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
186. Convention, supra note 12, art. 34; ECHR RuLEs, supra note 40, R. 39.
Fall 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
cumstances for wrongs suffered by applicants. 187 These are further de-
scribed in the following two sections.
2. The Court Can "Request" that Status Quo Be Maintained
The first remedy beyond declaratory relief is that the Court may
"request . . . interim measure[s] which it considers should be
adopted" whenever needed for "the proper conduct of the proceed-
ings before it."'l In essence, this is akin to a very limited temporary
injunction requiring that a member state maintain the status quo in a
particular situation pending adjudication by the Court. The website of
the Court, in a section providing information to applicants, states: "In
exceptional circumstances, the Court may... grant interim measures.
As a matter of practice it only does so where there is a serious risk of
physical harm to the applicant. '189 This limited power is derived from
Article 34 of the Convention providing for the right of "any per-
son... claiming to be a victim of a violation" of the Convention by a
member state to file an application for relief.190 The final sentence of
Article 34 provides that member states shall "undertake not to hinder
in any way the effective exercise of this right."'191
Pursuant to this Article, the Court has adopted Rule 39 providing
generally for "interim measures."' 92 A Chamber (or President of its
Section) may, on request of a party or its own motion, "indicate to the
parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in
the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceed-
ings before it."'19 3 This power was exercised in the recent case of Ma-
matkulov v. Turkey. 194 In Mamatkulov, Uzbekistan (which is not a
signatory to the Convention) sought to extradite Mamatkulov who, in
turn, filed an application with the Court of Human Rights claiming
187. Convention, supra note 12, art. 34; ECHR RuLEs, supra note 40, R. 41.
188. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 39.
189. European Court of Human Rights, Frequently Asked Questions, What Is the
Court of Human Rights Not Able to Do for Me?, http://www.echr.coe.int (follow the "Ap-
plicants" hyperlink; then follow the "What is the Court of Human Rights not able to do for
me?" hyperlink).
190. Convention, supra note 12, art. 34.
191. Id
192. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 39.
193. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 39(1).
194. Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, App. No. 46827/99, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 501
(2005). Prior to the revision of the Convention which established a full time Court, the
Grand Chamber of the then existing Court had ruled to the contrary in a 10-9 decision in
Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 42-44 (1991).
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that the extradition would be contrary to Article 3.195 The Court is-
sued a "request" to Turkey pursuant to Rule 39 to keep Mamatkulov
in Turkey until the Court had resolved his application. 196 Neverthe-
less, Turkey honored the extradition request without waiting until the
Court had adjudicated the matter.19 7 Uzbekistan then tried Ma-
matkulov for murder and sentenced him to twenty years in prison. 198
In the Mamatkulov case, the principal remedy was a determina-
tion that Mamatkulov had been improperly extradited because the
"request" of the Court had not been honored and thus the extradition
was in violation of Article 34.199 But this determination did not free
Mamatkulov from the Uzbekistan prison. 20 0 The net result is that the
Court may request an interim measure, but it has no direct way of
enforcing it either at the time of the request or in the event of a
breach. The presumption is that Turkey and other member states will
honor the precedent set out in Mamatkulov in future instances where
an extradition is challenged as being contrary to the Convention (or
any other action where the status quo needs to be maintained pend-
ing a determination by the Court). Rule 39 does permit the President
of a Section to issue a request alone, 20 1 but whether this power can be
utilized effectively in instances where the member state is about to act
is not known.
3. The Court Can Make Monetary "Just Satisfaction" Awards
The only permanent remedy other than declaratory relief availa-
ble to the Strasbourg Court is the award, under Article 41, of mone-
tary damages. 20 2 However, nothing in the Convention or the Rules of
the Court spell out what is involved in determining whether to make a
'Just satisfaction" award, and if so, in what amount.
Perhaps the most common award is for attorney's fees for a suc-
cessful applicant (though the amount of this award has often been
195. Mamatkulov & Askarov, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 522-23.
196. Id at 501.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 502.
199. Id. at 530.
200. Id. at 530-31. The court awarded Mamatkulov C5,000 in "nonpecuniary" dam-
ages. Id. at 531.
201. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 39.
202. Convention, supra note 12, art. 41 ("If the Court finds that there has been a viola-
tion of the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Con-
tracting Party [i.e., member state] concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.").
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relatively small).203 Further, in some instances, the result of the litiga-
tion in a member state has involved the applicant having paid fines to
the state or damages to another person, which, subsequently, the
Court finds were imposed in contravention of the Convention. 20 4 An
award of 'Just satisfaction" in the amount the now successful applicant
had paid out under the previous judgment is easily measured and cer-
tainly justified. 20 5 Somewhat more amorphous are situations where
the applicant has been damaged by the state action or inaction, but to
an uncertain degree, such as the loss of probable wages or other mon-
etary benefits. At least on some occasions the judgment of the Court
has found that such a loss has occurred and has granted a 'just satis-
faction" award. 20 6
Many of the Convention violations found in cases before the
Court do not involve direct monetary loss and sometimes involve no
measurable pecuniary loss at all. These often involve matters such as
false arrest, torture, prison condition violations, loss of civil or politi-
cal rights, loss of family rights, governmental invasion of privacy, envi-
ronmental harm caused or condoned by a government, and many
other similar matters. In these situations the Court has reached mixed
results. Sometimes the Court will simply state that the award of the
declaratory judgment itself constitutes 'Just satisfaction" and that no
203. OvEY & WHITE, supra note 25, at 418. The Court awarded Mamatkulov C15,000 for
legal costs and expenses. Mamatkulov & Askarov, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 531. In Ceylan v.
Turkey, App. No. 23556/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 73 (1999), the Court awarded F15,000 (ap-
proximately $3,000) for legal costs. Id at 93.
204. See, e.g., Bladet Tromso & Stensas v. Norway, App. No. 21980/93, 29 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 125, 153-54 (1999); Lingens v. Austria (No. 2), App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep.
407, 421-22 (1986).
205. See, e.g., Bladet, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 153-54; Lingens, 8 Eur. H.R_ Rep. at 421-22.
206. See, e.g., Former King of Greece v. Greece, App. No. 25701/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep.
21 (2000) (awarding C 12,000,000 for violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 for property that
had been expropriated from the King after his abdication); Z v. United Kingdom, App. No.
29392/95, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 149 (2001) (awarding four children £320,000 to recom-
pense for severe child abuse that occurred because of the dereliction of a government
agency); see also Case of the Former King of Greece v. Greece, App. No. 25701/94 (Eur. Ct.
H. R., Sept. 25, 2001), available at HUDOC search, supra note 2 (searching for App. No.
25701/94 and selecting the "Judgment (Just Satisfaction)" document); Smith & Grady v.
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24, 620 (2000)
(finding that the discharge of two members of the United Kingdom armed forces because
they were discovered to be homosexual was contrary to Article 8, and awarding one
£59,000 and the other £40,000 for lost wages and lost retirement benefits, and awarding
each attorney's fees and approximately £20,000 for non pecuniary losses). But see Ceylan v.
Turkey, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 73 (1999) (discussing that a pecuniary award is not always made
for damages); discussion supra note 203.
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additional pecuniary award is required.20 7 For example, as to cases of
improper detention by police or improper refusal to grant bail (viola-
tions of Article 5 of the Treaty) the Court has stated that it "has [in
the past] made relatively small awards in respect of non-pecuniary
damage. However, in more recent cases, it has declined to make any
such award. '208 Sometimes the Court will award a small sum of money
on an equitable basis. 209 In Ceylan v. Turkey,2 10 the Court gave approxi-
mately $8000211 to a labor union leader "on an equitable basis" for
twenty months of wrongful imprisonment.21 2 Ceylan had been impris-
oned for publishing a statement about Kurdish rights-a statement
the Court had found was protected by Article 10.213 In Keegan v. Ire-
land,214 a child was taken away from her father without a hearing and
was given by adoption to another family.2 15 The Strasbourg Court de-
cided that the denial of the father's right to be heard was a violation
of Article 8 of the Convention, but by the time it decided the matter
(six years after the adoption occurred) it was not in the interests of
the child to reverse the adoption, and so it awarded the father approx-
207. See, e.g., United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 121 (1998) (holding that a ban of a political party and disenfranchisement of its
leaders-which lasted seven years before the Strasbourg Court ruled-was in violation of
Article 11, but the "judgment [finding the ban contrary to the Convention] constitutes in
itself sufficient just satisfaction" for the wrong committed).
208. Caballero v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32819/96, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 643, 644
(2000) (awarding "on an equitable basis" damages of £1000 for a wrongful refusal to grant
bail).
209. See Fressoz & Roire v. France, App. No. 29183/95, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2, 62 (1999)
(awarding the equivalent of approximately $10,000 (F60,000) on an equitable basis to jour-
nalists who were improperly prosecuted for publishing in a newspaper the high salary of a
company executive-which was a matter of public record-during a labor dispute involv-
ing the executive's employer); see also REID, PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 126, at
548-86 (noting example cases where monetary "just satisfaction" has been awarded, and
noting a number of cases holding the judgment itself constituted sufficient "just satisfac-
tion"); see generally DAVID ScoREY & TIM EicKE, HUMAN RIGHTS DAMAGES, PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTiCE (2001) (summarizing all damage cases in the Strasbourg Court).
210. App. No. 23556/94, 30 Eur. H.R Rep. 73 (1999).
211. Awards have traditionally been made in the currency of the member state being
sued, although recently the Court has used the euro as the relevant currency. I have trans-
lated the amounts awarded (other than those awarded in euros or British pounds) into the
approximate United States dollar equivalent.
212. Ceylan, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 92. The Grand Chamber awarded Ceylan attorneys
fees as well. Id. at 93.
213. Id at 76, 86-91.
214. App. No. 16969/90, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 342 (1994). Compare Keegan v. Ireland, 18
Eur. H.R. Rep. 342, 366 (1994) (awarding substantial attorney fees), with Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (involving the same issue and result as in Keegan v. Ireland, with-
out awarding substantial attorney fees).
215. Keegan, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 342.
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imately $15,000 for the "trauma, anxiety, and feelings of injustice that
the applicant must have experienced" in losing his daughter without a
hearing.216
The Court has never identified which factors are or should be
considered in making a non-pecuniary equitable award. Judging from
the small amounts involved in some cases, it would appear that the
awards are merely symbolic. An $8000 award for twenty months of
wrongful imprisonment seems pitifully small (at least to someone fa-
miliar with civil rights cases in the United States where six-figure dam-
ages are not uncommon), and even $15,000 for permanent loss of
custody and companionship of one's own child because of the wrong-
ful act of the Irish government seems to be little more than tokenism
(again, at least as judged by United States standards). But, in other
cases, the amounts granted for non-pecuniary loss have been some-
what more substantial. In Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 217 the
Court awarded the applicants £19,000 each in addition to substantial
pecuniary damages.218
The evidentiary rules governing the determination of the appro-
priate amounts of 'just satisfaction" are unclear (or maybe even non-
existent). In Ceylan, 219 the applicant made a claim for wages lost
during his twenty month imprisonment and, according to the Court,
submitted a "certificate" by his employer as to what his earnings were
both before and after the imprisonment. 220 Turkey argued that Cey-
lan had "not substantiated his alleged earnings."221 The Court's reso-
lution was merely: "the loss which the applicant claims to have
suffered has not been sufficiently proven" without further explana-
tion.22 2 As discussed earlier, the Court has no rules of evidence similar
216. Id. at 366.
217. App. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24, 620, 635 (2000).
218. Id. at 635; see supra note 206 (detailing pecuniary damages awarded to Smith and
Grady).
219. App. No. 23556/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 73 (1999).
220. Id. at 92.
221. Id.
222. Id.; see also Assanidze v. Georgia, App. No. 71503/01, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32,
660-61, 701 (2004) (awarding the applicant, mayor of a city who was incarcerated since
1991 despite having had his conviction reversed and a pardon granted, C150,000 in dam-
ages for wrongful imprisonment from January 2001 to April 2004 without specific indica-
tion on how the Grand Chamber arrived at the award amount). The Assanidze case is
notable because the applicant was imprisoned by a breakaway section of Georgia, and the
central government had no physical ability to secure his release. Nevertheless, the Court
held that Georgia had to pay damages. Id. at 701. The beginning point for damages of
January 2001 was chosen because that was the date Assanidize was acquitted on appeal of
the charges that had led to his incarceration. Id. at 698.
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to those known in the United States (or in Britain and Ireland, for
that matter).223 There are no standards as to what kinds of evidence-
such as some kinds of hearsay-are admissible or inadmissible. There
are no provisions for cross-examination or impeachment of witnesses.
Given the sparseness of the provisions on evidence in Rule Al, the
cryptic holding in Ceylan gives precious little guidance as to what
would constitute sufficient proof in future cases of this kind, but Cey-
lan does offer that some "examination" may be possible. 224
Since only a member state can be a defendant in a case before
the Court, only damages that can be attributed to the state can be
awarded as just satisfaction. 225 Hence, damages occasioned by a pri-
vate party cannot be recompensed by the Court.226 Furthermore, the
Court merely finds that an award of 'just satisfaction" is required, but
it has no direct enforcement power.227 It is up to the member state to
comply with the judgment, and the only ultimate sanction for failure
to comply is the possibility of expulsion from the Council of
Europe. 228
C. Comparisons and Contrasts with the United States Supreme
Court
In some respects the Strasbourg Court occupies a similar role to-
wards its member countries as the Supreme Court does to the state
courts of the United States. The Strasbourg Court does not interpret
the laws of its member states but only determines whether there are
breaches of the Convention. 229 Similarly, the Supreme Court does not
interpret state law but only whether a state court decision contravenes
223. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. The only "evidentiary" rule of the
ECHR Rules is Rule Al, permitting a Chamber to "obtain any evidence [that clarifies] the
facts of the case." ECHR RuLEs, supra note 40, R. Al. The Rule further permits a Chamber
to receive documentary evidence and to "hear ... a witness or expert" whose evidence
.seems likely to assist it in carrying out its tasks." Id. But, other than a requirement that
statements can be required to be under oath, id. R. A6, and are subject to examination, id.
R. A7, there are no standards set out upon which to judge "evidence" received by it.
224. The sparseness of the language in CQyan stands in marked contrast to the ex-
tremely detailed "just satisfaction" decision in Smith & Grady, App. Nos. 33985/96 and
33986/96, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24, 620 (2001), decided about one year later.
225. Convention, supra note 12, arts. 34, 41.
226. Id.
227. See supra note 202; see also OvEY & WHITE, supra note 25, at 423-25 (discussing the
enforcement of just satisfaction awards).
228. See supra note 202; see also OvEy & WHITE, supra note 25, at 423-25 (discussing the
enforcement of just satisfaction awards).
229. Convention, supra note 12, art. 32.
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the Constitution.2 0 Also, much of the litigation in the Strasbourg
Court has counterparts in substance to litigation carried out in federal
courts in the United States. The most litigated provision of the Euro-
pean Convention is Article 6231 with a substantial number of cases aris-
ing under Articles 3, 5, and 7.232 Decisions on cases arising under
these four articles closely resemble the habeas corpus decisions of
United States courts. Further, pursuant to Article 41, monetary dam-
ages are often sought in cases arising under these articles of the Con-
vention.23 3 The bases for awarding damages are somewhat similar to
the bases for awarding damages in civil rights cases in the United
States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983.234
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000). The Supreme Court, however, has a very substantial
caseload interpreting federal law, something which has no equivalent in the Strasbourg
Court. In addition, many federal statutes may have an effect of modifying or otherwise
affecting state laws, and thus the issues on review of a state court decision may include
application or interpretation of federal laws (which control because of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution) as well as direct application of the Constitution itself. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 44-46 (2d ed. 2002).
231. See, e.g., European Court of Human Rights, Subject Matter of Judgments Deliv-
ered by the Court in 2004, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR (follow the "Case-Law" hyper-
link, then follow the "Subject matter of judgments" hyperlink, then follow the "Subject
matter of judgments before the Court in 2004" hyperlink) [hereinafter Subject Matter,
2004] (The Strasbourg Court has no statistical summary showing the relative frequency of
cases invoking the protection of specific articles of the Convention. The list of decided
cases refers to the article or articles of the Convention that are the basis for the decisions
rendered and only by scanning the list for each year can one determine how often various
articles are involved in cases. Even a cursory scan of the list for 2004 shows that the over-
whelming number of cases decided involve Article 6.); see also SCOREY & EICKE, supra note
209, at A3-1 (indicating that many cases arise under Article 5 and 6). Of course, the de-
cided cases do not necessarily represent the number of cases filed to enforce various arti-
cles and since a vast majority of cases are rejected as "inadmissible" without opinion of any
sort, there is no information on the article or articles invoked by the unsuccessful appli-
cants. Even so, it is not hard to imagine that Article 6 is a prominent basis for even unsuc-
cessful applications.
232. See, e.g., Subject Matter, 2004, supra note 231. The prohibition of torture has been
applied very broadly, similar to the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Selmouni v. France, App. 25803/
94, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403 (1999).
233. Convention, supra note 12, art. 41 (allowing a "just satisfaction" award).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section,
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The comparison should not be carried too far. The United States
Supreme Court has a vast structure of lower federal courts below it
that initially review whether state courts have properly applied the
Constitution.23 5 Most habeas corpus cases arising from state court pro-
ceedings are determined at the United States district court level.
Some are subject to further review in courts of appeal, but very few are
actually decided by the Supreme Court.23 6 The same is true for civil
rights cases filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.23 7 When there are disputes
about relevant facts, the district courts in the United States have all of
the resources of a trial court for factual determination.23 8 In contrast,
the Strasbourg Court has to decide all such cases itself, since it has no
lower courts within its purview. 239 Further, the Court's ability to de-
cide contested facts is extremely limited at best.240 This concentration
of decision making in the Strasbourg Court takes place in a jurisdic-
tion (i.e., the member states of the Convention) in which the aggre-
gate population is almost three times larger than that of the United
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
235. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
236. It may well be that a substantial number of petitions for a writ of certiorari filed
with the Supreme Court involve habeas corpus, but few are actually granted and decided
by a plenary opinion of the Court.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing that civil rights cases under § 1983 can be filed in
state court, but most are filed in federal district court).
238. This includes the availability of pre-trial discovery, subpoena of relevant witnesses,
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, a highly developed set of rules of evi-
dence, and, where appropriate, availability of a jury to decide pertinent contested facts.
239. Convention, supra note 12, art. 19. The Strasbourg Court is divided into four Sec-
tions and subdivided into three Chambers, and decision making takes place in a Chamber
of a Section. Court Composition, supra note 71. However, the President of each Section is a
member of each Chamber, and all other members of the Section are members of two
Chambers. Id. Finally, whenever a Chamber deliberates, all members of the Section are
present, though only those assigned to the Chamber may vote. See WORKING METHODS RE-
PORT, supra note 97, at 10. So, in effect, assuming the President of a Section is thoroughly
involved in each deliberation, there are the equivalent of four "courts" (i.e., decision mak-
ing bodies) compared to only one United States Supreme Court. In addition, the courts of
the country from which the "appeal" arises have presumably reviewed the matter, but that
is little different than in the United States, at least as far as habeas corpus is concerned,
since, generally, the federal court habeas corpus jurisdiction cannot be invoked until a
state court has completed its review. (Of course, there are also habeas corpus petitions
filed on behalf of persons being held by federal officials which are reviewed in the first
instance by federal district courts.).
240. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
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States241 and includes some very troubled areas-where Convention
violations are more likely to occur.242
A further contrast is that the Supreme Court has many proce-
dures available to remedy violations of the Constitution.243 Damages
can be awarded, declaratory relief can be granted, injunctions (pre-
liminary and permanent) may be issued, persons under custody may
be ordered released, masters (or other supervisors of decrees) can be
appointed, and lower court judgments can be reversed.244 Anyone vio-
lating the orders of a United States court can be arrested and prose-
cuted for contempt.24 5 In contrast, the Strasbourg Court is very
limited in its remedies. It can award declaratory relief and monetary
damages in some instances246 and has no direct enforcement
mechanisms.
A final contrast is that the Supreme Court, with very minor excep-
tions, has discretion to deny review of a case tendered it and exercises
this discretion to reject almost ninety-eight percent of cases where par-
ties seek review.247 Decisions to grant review are not based simply on
correction of errors made by a lower court, but are primarily made for
the purpose of deciding important issues affecting the legal system as
a whole, so as to give guidance to lower courts on the administration
ofjustice.248 The Strasbourg Court, on the other hand, is presumably
241. 2005 WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 7, at 623, 808-41 (noting the population of the
United States in the 2000 census to be 281 million, and the population of Europe's mem-
ber states is approximately 803 million).
242. Just to mention a few, the Kurdish areas of Turkey, Chechnya, and Kosovo.
243. The lower courts under the Supreme Court similarly have many procedures avail-
able to remedy violations of the Constitution.
244. See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 28-40 (5th ed. 2001).
245. Id.
246. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3. The Court also has the power under Rule 39 to "re-
quest" that a member state maintain the status quo. See ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 39;
supra Part I. However, this is more limited than injunctive power of a court in the United
States inasmuch as it is limited to a request directed at a member state (not private par-
ties), and it is only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and presumably cannot
require a member state to do any particular act beyond maintaining the status quo.
247. SUPREME CT. OF THE UNITED STATES, (CHIEF JUSTICE's) 2004 YEAR END REPORT ON
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2004year-endreport.pdf (noting that in the 2003 term ending June 30, 2004, there
were 7814 petitions for review and eighty-nine cases decided by the Court).
248. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 798 (West Publishing Co. 5th ed.
1994) (1963). Obviously, judges of any court want to do "justice" and decide cases
presented to them "fairly." But, in the United States system of law, the supervisory role over
trial courts is performed mainly by the United States Courts of Appeal in federal cases and
by the appellate courts of the various states. But there are simply not enough hours in the
year for the United States Supreme Court to consider whether there is error or "injustice"
in all of the cases presented to them, and to even attempt to do so would mean virtual
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obligated to accept and decide any case presented to it that credibly
alleges a violation of the Convention. This has led to an explosion in
the number of cases considered by the Court.249 Further, this explo-
sion in case numbers is exacerbated by the inability of the Court to
decide cases on a summary basis and by the lack of a mechanism to
remand to a national court for reconsideration based on Strasbourg
court prior decisions. 250
Nevertheless, the use of the word "presumably" in the previous
paragraph is done advisedly. Though there is nothing in the Conven-
tion or the Rules of the Court granting discretion to ignore what,
prima facie, appear to be credible claims, some observers of the Court
suspect that a substantial amount of discretion is exercised in re-
jecting cases.2 51 The ratio between the number of applications for re-
lief filed with the Court and the number of cases actually taken gives
some credence to this suspicion. For example, in 2004 there were de-
cisions on admissibility on over 21,000 applications, but only 830 cases
were deemed worthy of further consideration. 25 2 While undoubtedly a
abandonment of its much more important role of giving guidance to the entire judicial
system on important issues.
249. See infra notes 345-50 and accompanying text.
250. For example, the Strasbourg Court has found that the Italian court system is in
violation of Article Six because of extensive delays in getting cases to trial and on appeal.
See, e.g., MowBRAY Text, supra note 38, at 307; Marie-Aude Beernaert, Protocol 14 and New
Strasbourg Procedures: Towards Greater Efficiency? And at What Price, 2004 EUR. HUM. RTs. L.
REv. 544, 545 (2004) [hereinafter Beernaert, Protocol 14]. The Strasbourg Court now re-
ceives hundreds of applications from litigants aggrieved by the delays (not only from Italy,
but from several other countries as well). See MowBRAv Text, supra note 38, at 307; Beer-
naert, Protocol 14, supra. The Court has to decide these cases; it cannot simply remand to
the Italian Courts for reconsideration based on clear precedent from the Strasbourg
Court. Further, each of these hundreds of cases is decided with a full written opinion
laying out the facts, the pertinent law and the conclusions of the Court. The opinions are
probably similar, with the main changes being the names and basic facts, but it must still be
a time consuming process (at least for the Registar's staff) compared to a summary reversal
without opinion.
251. Confidential Sources, supra note 23. The Evaluation Group set up by the Council
of Europe to study ways of coping with the caseload of the Court suggested some discre-
tionary authority to reject cases raising issues of "minor or secondary importance." COUN-
CIL OF EUR., REPORT OF THE EVALUATION GROUP TO THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS ON THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (EG-CoURT(2001)1) para. 92 (2001), available at
http://www.coe.int/T/CM/home-en.asp (follow the "Advanced Search" hyperlink; then
search for "EG-CoURT(2001)1" in the keyword field; then select "EG-CouRT(2001)1")
[hereinafter EVALUATION GROUP REPORT]. Perhaps the suggestion was made to regularize
current practice.
252. See SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 2004, supra note 59, at 35. This ratio of rejection is get-
ting higher every year. In 2001 only ninety-two percent (8989/9728) of the applications
were rejected, and in 1997, the last year of the former Commission and Court, only eighty-
one percent (3073/3777) of the applications were rejected. Id.
Fall 2005] HUMAN RIGHTS COURT
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
fair number of applications are unfounded, it seems surprising that
close to ninety-seven percent of them are unable to even allege a
prima facie credible violation. 253 But without further information,
questions about the Court's exercise of discretion in choosing which
cases to hear are merely a matter of conjecture.
m. Some Jurisprudential Principles of the Strasbourg Court
A. The Requirement of a Uniform Application of the Convention
It is a basic principle of the Convention that the standards in the
Convention are to be applied with equal force to each member state.
The Convention refers to this principle somewhat indirectly in its Pre-
amble, noting that its goals are "best maintained" by a "common un-
derstanding and observance of the human rights upon which they
depend."254 The Court has never referred directly to this principle in
any majority opinion. A few dissents, however, have complained that a
majority opinion has ignored this principle. 255 In the Report of the
253. The vast majority of applications filed are rejected as being "manifestly ill-
founded" (the term used when a case is rejected by a Committee). Convention, supra note
12, art. 35(3); Wildhaber, Oslo Speech, supra note 154, at 6 (noting that mainfestly inad-
missible cases constitute ninety percent of applications). It may be that some of the appli-
cations are made by lay individuals who have no knowledge of the scope of the Court's
jurisdiction, but it would seem probable that many of the applications are made with the
assistance of a lawyer who is acquainted with the relevant provisions of the Convention and
would not file an application that had little or no chance of succeeding. So, it is at least
surprising that the ratio of summary rejection is so high. Further, I have been told by
lawyers familiar with the Court that they have seen applications that did appear to present
serious issues but which were, nevertheless, rejected as "manifestly unfounded." While re-
jected applications are, in theory, available for public inspection, the procedure to see a
file is tedious. A file has to be specifically requested in writing, and a time must be set up to
examine it under the supervision of a member of the Registrar's staff and general requests
for multiple files cannot be made. See European Court of Human Rights, Press, http://
www.echr.coe.int/ (follow "Press" hyperlink; then follow "Rules on access to case files"
hyperlink). Further, applications may be written in any one of the thirty-seven languages
used in the member states, and if rejected at an early stage, are not translated. WORKING
METHODS REPORT, supra note 97, at 11. So, as a practical matter it is impossible to deter-
mine whether this occurs regularly or are isolated events-or are simply mistakes of the
observers as to whether the rejected applications are, in fact, meritorious. Thus, at best it is
only a suspicion that there currently exists at least some exercise of discretion in deciding
whether the Court will consider a case. See also OvEv & WHITE, supra note 25, at 404 (ex-
pressing concern that summary rejection of applications by Committees without explana-
tion will "no longer build up an easily consulted body of decisions clarifying the grounds of
inadmissibility").
254. Convention, supra note 12, pmbl.
255. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413,
484 (1996) (Martens and Palm, JJ., dissenting in part) (referring to "the necessity of uni-
form standards being applied in this respect to all Member States"); Cossey v. United King-
dom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622, 652 (1990) (Martens, J., dissenting)
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Council of Europe's Evaluation Group ("Evaluation Group") on the
problem of the growing backlog of cases, 256 the Preface refers to the
Court as "the nerve centre of a system of human rights protection
[that] sets common legal standards [for the member] States."257 For
this reason, the Evaluation Group Report rejected suggestions to cre-
ate "regional tribunals" for the Court because this would carry "a risk
of diverging standards and case-law, whereas the essence of the Con-
vention system is that uniform and coherent standards... should ob-
tain throughout the [member] States."258 Despite the paucity of
reference in cases to this point, all observers of the Court agree with
this basic premise. 259 This principle, while laudable, has the potential
of creating severe logistical problems for the Court in the future. It
means, for example, that prison conditions have to meet a certain
standard to avoid being in violation of Article 3 in England, Germany,
and France and meet the same standard to avoid being a violation in
Russia, Armenia, and Albania. Why this is a problem of considerable
magnitude will be discussed later in Part IV.B.
B. The Standards of Review and the Degree of Scrutiny: The
Doctrines of "Proportionality," "Margin of
Appreciation," and "Subsidiarity"
The Strasbourg Court does not sit at the apex of an integrated
court structure. Rather, it is a court set up by a treaty among partici-
pating countries, and it operates independently of the courts of any of
the member states.2 60 It exists solely to interpret and apply the provi-
sions of the Convention,261 and there is no national body of law upon
which it is competent to rule. The participating countries do not share
(citing the preamble). It could be argued that the "Margin of Appreciation" cuts away from
this principle. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. There have been debates in the literature
about this. Compare Paul Mahoney, Universality Versus Subsidiarity in Strasbourg Case Law on
Free Speech: Explaining Some Recent Judgments, 1997 EUR. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 364 (1997) [here-
inafter Mahoney, Universality], with Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Universality Versus Sub-
sidiarity: A Reply, 1998 EUR. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 73 (1998). But, by and large, the concept of
Margin of Appreciation has been applied to Articles 8 through 11 dealing with liberties,
and never has the Court suggested that any national variance would be tolerated as to
Articles 2 or 3, which deal with protection of life and prevention of torture. Convention,
supra note 12, arts. 2-3, 8-11.
256. EVALUATION GROUP REPORT, supra note 251.
257. Id. at Preface.
258. Id. para. 83.
259. Confidential Sources, supra note 23.
260. Convention, supra note 12, art. 19; see also OVEY & WHITE, supra note 25, at 440.
261. Convention, supra note 12, art. 19.
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a common source of law and have major cultural differences.262 A sub-
stantial number are, at best, emerging democracies. The problems of
administering a single system of fundamental rights in such a context
can be formidable. Thus, there are legitimate issues as to exactly what
the nature of the review of member state decisions should be.
In the United States, the rules are clear on the standards of re-
view applicable in an appeal of a lower court decision. On pure issues
of law, United States appellate courts generally review lower court de-
terminations on a de novo basis-that is, they decide the law issues
without reference to the lower court determination. 263 However, on
factual determinations or on issues where the lower court has discre-
tion, the review is said to be on the basis of whether the lower court
had abused its discretion. 264 When issues of whether statutory laws in-
fringe on protected classes of people or protected rights are
presented to American courts, the courts will subject such laws to
"strict scrutiny" and look for a "compelling state interest" in determin-
ing whether such a law is valid.265 A myriad of appellate court opin-
ions in the United States refer to these terms in describing the nature
of the review being undertaken.2 6 6
In contrast, a search for similar terms in Strasbourg Court deci-
sions yields no comparable use of these terms. The terms "abuse of
discretion" or "de novo" have never been used to describe the Court's
262. United Kingdom and Ireland, alone among member states, have a common law
tradition. Most of the other member states have a system of law derived from the Napole-
onic Codes, though with major differences. The range of cultures include socially liberal
Scandinavia; socially conservative Spain; Muslim societies in Albania, Turkey, and Azerbai-
jan; and fundamentalist Muslim parts of Chechnya (which is part of Russia, and thus within
the purview of the Strasbourg Court). Though, in form, any member of the Council of
Europe (the prerequisite to being a member state of the Convention) must be a democ-
racy, the reality in some countries (or in some areas of some countries) is tenuous. See infra
notes 373-79 and accompanying text.
263. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (indicating that an issue that
presents a question of law, not one of 'legal facts' . . . must be resolved de novo on
appeal").
264. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 230, at 529.
265. Id. This paragraph does not purport to describe in detail the standards of review
in the United States. There are many "ifs, ands, and buts" on the details of review. The only
point to be made by the paragraph is that there is a reasonably clear general structure
concerning the standards of review in the United States.
266. A Westlaw search of these terms in the database of appellate decisions yields
thousands of cases where one or more of these terms are used. The term "abuse of discre-
tion" appears in over 10,000 federal appellate cases since 2001; note that Westlaw will only
display up 10,000 cases with the selected key phrases at a time. Westlaw search, CTA
database, Sept. 24, 2005 (searching for phrase "abuse of discretion").
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scope of review. 26 7 The Court has twice used the phrase "strict scru-
tiny" in its majority opinions to describe its scope of review, but not in
connection with the review of a statute or a law of a member state, and
only in connection with how a particular article of the Convention is
to be interpreted. 268 Thus, in these two instances the term has not
been defined or used in a manner similar to, for example, how the
phrase is used in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. 269
The terminology of strict scrutiny of statutes is not unknown to
members of the Court. In a partly dissenting opinion to Chassagnou v.
France,270 in which the validity of a French statute was being chal-
lenged, Judge Zupancic observed:
It should also be understood, however, that the mild rational rela-
tionship discrimination test applies to social and economic issues
[such as those involved in Chassagnou]. If this was a suspect classifi-
cation in terms of race, alienage or national origin, etc., the strict
scrutiny test would apply, i.e. the Convention would be deemed to
be violated unless there were a compelling state interest and the
law in question would be suitably tailored to serve it.2 7
1
This language is, of course, very similar to the test used by the United
States Supreme Court for protection of fundamental rights or suspect
267. The phrase "abuse of discretion" appears in only two decisions of the Court,
Beldjoudi v. France, App. No. 12083/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 801, 805 (1992), where the term
was used in an argument by a party and in Nikula v. Finland, App. No. 31611/96, 38 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 45, 950, 952, 959 (2002), in reference to a court proceeding in Finland before
the case reached the Strasbourg Court. The phrase "de novo" appears in eight decisions of
the Court, but in all instances it is used in connection with judicial reviews conducted
within the member state before the case reached the Court. See, e.g., Prager & Oberschlick
v. Austria, App. No. 15974/90, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 28 (1995).
268. Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 28 (2002)
(using the term "strict scrutiny" to describe the review undertaken when a violation of
Article 2 (Right to Life) was charged in a case involving a denial of the right to assisted
suicide by a terminally ill elderly person and citing McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No.
18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 151, 160 (1995), which held that Article 2 should be
strictly construed" and concluded that the state committed no violation of Article 2 in
refusing to allow an assisted suicide); Nilsen &Johnsen v. Norway, App. No. 23188/93, 30
Eur. H.R. Rep. 878, 879 (1999) (reviewing an Article 10 (Freedom of Expression) case libel
award involving allegedly false allegations in connection with police misconduct). The rele-
vant language from Nilsen being: "restrictions placed on the right to impart and receive
information on arguable allegations of police misconduct call for a strict scrutiny on the
part of the Court." Id.
269. As noted above, this kind of review is applied in the United States to review of
legislative (or administrative) determinations. See supra note 265.
270. App. Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95, and 28443/95, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 615 (1999).
Chassagnou dealt with whether a statute could compel farm owners to join hunting clubs
that would result in hunts being conducted on their lands. Id. at 615-16. The majority held
that this was a violation of Article 11 (The Right of Association). Id. at 622.
271. Id. at 699 (Zupancic, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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classifications. 272 Judge Zupancic cites no Strasbourg Court cases sup-
porting this approach. Rather, he observes that "[a]dmittedly, these
are tests of equal protection typically applicable in constitutional liti-
gation before constitutional courts,"273 and thus he arguably concedes
that the Strasbourg Court has not adopted such an approach.
Of course, there is not a priori reason why the Strasbourg Court
should adopt either the terminology or the approach of United States
Courts on standards for judicial review, and it does have other mecha-
nisms that have some effect on its scope of review. These are discussed
in the next two subsections.2 74
1. The Doctrine of "Proportionality"
"Proportionality" appears to be the main device used by the
Court for governing the degree of scrutiny applied. It is often invoked
to determine whether the action of a member state in curtailing a
right protected by the Convention is reasonable under the circum-
stances. The Convention, with few exceptions, is designed and inter-
preted to provide that the rights contained in it are subject to
constraints based on the interests of the state. This is most apparent in
the structure of Articles 9 through 11, each of which has two clauses.
Taking Article 10 as an example, the first clause provides for freedom
of expression. 275 The second clause 276 initially further conditions the
power of the state to regulate speech by providing that any limits must
be "restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society."277 But it further provides twelve reasons why
restrictions on speech can be imposed. 278
272. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003).
273. Chassagnou, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 699 (Zupancic, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
274. The alternatives to be discussed do not provide much clarity.
275. Convention, supra note 12, art. 10(1).
276. Id. art. 10(2). The text of the second clause of Article 10 is set out supra note 34.
Articles 8, 9, 11, and 12 are similar in structure-both having a right and a restriction
clause. Even though the structure of the other articles providing for rights (Articles 2
through 7) is different, the Court appears to use a somewhat similar approach in deciding
whether specific actions are, in fact, violations of the Convention.
277. Id.
278. Id. The twelve reasons are:
[T]he interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and imparti-
ality of the judiciary.
[Vol. 40
The opinions of the Court often parse the text of an article in
deciding whether a violation of that article of the Convention has oc-
curred. Using Article 10 again as an example, if a violation of the Arti-
cle is alleged, the Court first determines whether the action of the
member state does, in fact, limit freedom of expression. 279 Then the
Court determines whether there is a law that restricts or prohibits the
expression. 280 If there is such a law, the Court must evaluate whether
such a limitation is "necessary in a democratic society" and in this lat-
ter respect, whether one (or more) of the twelve restrictions justify the
limitation.281
The ultimate test used by the Court in deciding whether the re-
strictions imposed by the law of the domestic state are "necessary in a
democratic society," and whether they are justified by one or more of
the twelve specified reasons is dependent upon whether the limita-
tions imposed are proportionate to the harm that is alleged to have
occurred. 28 2 It is fair to say that the "proportionality" test is, at a mini-
mum, somewhat stricter than the "rational relationship" test used by
the United States Supreme Court, but it rarely, if ever, reaches the
level of "strict scrutiny" as defined in United States jurisprudence.
When "proportionality" is analyzed in specific cases, however, in some
instances it is near the "rational relationship" test, and in others it is
not too far from the United States "strict scrutiny" analysis.
It is hard, perhaps impossible, to find consistency in the decisions
that would help define the "true" level of scrutiny used by the Court in
reviewing the decisions of member states. The Court did protect the
right of ajournalist to criticize the Austrian Chancellor for "protecting
former members of the Nazi SS" Corps28 3 but found that trenchant
279. See, e.g., Muller v. Switzerland, App. No. 10737/84, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 212,
224-25 (1988) (deciding the issue of whether a conviction for exhibiting an obscene paint-
ing violated Article 10 by first determining whether the relevant Swiss law constituted an
"interference by public authority").
280. Id. at 225-26 (discussing next whether the restriction on speech was "prescribed
by law").
281. Id. at 226-29 (discussing finally the "legitimacy of the aim pursued" and whether
the interference was "necessary in a democratic society"). The Court's opinions are often
written in a very mechanistic fashion, devoting a paragraph (or more) to each of the ana-
lytical steps outlined above. See, e.g., Muller v. Switzerland, App. No. 10737/84, 13 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 212 (1988); Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407 (1986);
ECHR RuLEs, supra note 40, R. 74 (setting out a detailed list of how an opinion shall be
structured).
282. Muller, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. at 227-28.
283. Lingens, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 407. The Lingensjudgment is one in which the Court
appears to use a fairly high standard of review-nearer a "strict scrutiny" approach. Id. at
418-21.
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criticism of a very pro-prosecution Austrian judge could be the basis of
a libel action.28 4 The Court found that a painting by a well established
artist containing some representations of bestiality and shown in a pri-
vate exhibition, could be suppressed as obscene. 28 5 The Court also
found that a film that was distinctly "anti-Christian" shown by a private
club could be confiscated because it would offend the sensibilities of
the residents of the region in question. 28 6 Finally, the Court found
that England could suppress a short film, titled "VISIONS OF EcsTASY,"
which depicted the visions of St. Teresa of Avila as sexually
motivated. 287
The Court has often hewed to a stricter standard in dealing with
claims of a violation of Article 8, the right to privacy.288 On the ques-
tion of laws criminalizing homosexuality, the Court has rejected any
invocation of "margin of appreciation"289 and any claim that "national
security" or "protection of health and morals" would be the basis for
maintaining such laws.2 90
284. Prager & Oberschlick v. Austria, App. No. 15974/90, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 21
(1995). The Pragerjudgment is one where the Court appears to use a fairly low standard of
review-nearer to a "rational relationship" approach. Id. The judgment drew a strongly
worded dissent from four judges that the majority was far too lenient in allowing the Aus-
trian judgment to stand. Id. at 22-33 (Pettiti, J., Martens, J., joined by Pekkanen, J.,
Makarczyk J., dissenting). The dissent argued that "the Court's supervisions [of freedoms
of expression] must be strict, which means inter alia that the necessity for restricting them
must be convincingly established." Id. at 23 (Martens, J., dissenting).
285. Muller, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 229.
286. Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (1994).
The case describes the film, DAS LIEBESKONZIL (Council in Heaven), depicting Christ, the
Virgin Mary, and God as dissolute and corrupt persons. Id. at 34. The film was confiscated
in Innsbruck, Austria, which the Court described as being predominately Catholic. Id. at
59. The advertisements for the film did describe the nature of the film, and the organiza-
tion stated that it was expected to be shown primarily to "persons with an interest in pro-
gressive culture." Id. at 37, 58-59. The film had been made, apparently lawfully, in Italy and
was based on a play that had been written almost one hundred years before (though, at
that time, had been banned in Munich). Id at 40-41. The play had also been performed in
Vienna shortly before the film was made. Id. at 47.
287. Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1997).
288. Convention, supra note 12, art. 8. The actual protection provided for in Article 8 is
"respect [for] ... private and family life ... [and] home." Id. The phrase "right to privacy"
is used as an abbreviation corresponding to a similar concept expressed in American law.
289. "Margin of Appreciation" as a measure of review is discussed infra Part III.B.2.
290. See Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485, 491-92, 494
(1993); Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186, 199 (1988); Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 167-69 (1981). These are three of the cases
cited in the United States Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576
(2003). In Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (2000), the Court deter-
mined that the military could not exclude homosexuals, but it did suggest that some limita-
tions on homosexual activity could be imposed by the military. Id. at 534-57. On the
general question of the inconsistency of the Court in applying a standard of review, see
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By the very nature of the wording of the articles of the Conven-
tion, the Court must strike a balance between the right protected and
the express limitations set out in the Convention. But there is nothing
in the Convention itself (except the vague phrase "necessary in a dem-
ocratic society") that guides the Court as to how to weigh the balance.
Further, from a review of the decisions of the Court, it is difficult to
determine what standard the Court thinks is appropriate and how it
will decide future cases. 291
2. The Doctrines of the "Margin of Appreciation" and
"Subsidiarity"
Two of the concepts developed by the Strasbourg Court to limit
the scope of the Court's review are interrelated. One is referred to as
the "margin of appreciation," and the other is known as the principle
of "subsidiarity." The "margin of appreciation" is a somewhat nebu-
lous concept borrowed from French law. 292 In essence, the concept is
that there is room for countries to differ in what is acceptable under
the terms of the Convention based on cultural differences. 293 Thus,
using the "margin of appreciation" concept, the Court has discretion
under the Convention to find a law or practice violative of the Con-
vention in one member country, but acceptable in another-even
though both ratified the Convention.
One of the earliest expressions of the doctrine of "margin of ap-
preciation" was in the case of Handyside v. United Kingdom.294 In Handy-
side the issue was whether a book, THE LITTLE RED SCHOOL-BOOK,
could be banned as obscene in contravention of Article 10 of the Con-
Lord Lester of Herne Hill, supra note 255, at 73-81. His comments are directed mainly at
the "margin of appreciation," but his criticism is of what he deems to be a "standardless
doctrine," which will "become the source of a pernicious 'variable geometry' of human
rights." Id.
291. Of course, this might be a criticism that can be leveled against any system ofjuris-
prudence testing the legitimacy of any governmental action by a balancing test. The "com-
pelling state interest" standard used by the United States Supreme Court (along with the
"least restrictive means" corollary) is, in some sense, a "balancing test," but its locus is at the
very end of the "balance" and thus is not simply a balance of public good versus harm to a
protected right with no predilection as to which value is to be favored. See also Antonin
Scalia, The Law of Rules as a Rule of Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182, 1186 (1989) (expres-
sing doubt as to the ability of courts to evaluate multi-factored balancing tests on a princi-
pled basis).
292. See, e.g., MowBRAv Text, supra note 38, at 449; REID, PRtcrriONER's GuIDE, supra
note 126, at 38-40.
293. See, e.g., MowBRAY Text, supra note 38, at 449-50.
294. 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 (1976).
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vention, which protects freedom of expression. 295 In several other Eu-
ropean countries-e.g., Denmark and Netherlands-the book
circulated freely.29 6 When the case was heard in the European Com-
mission (now defunct, but which was in existence when Handyside was
decided), there was a division of opinion between those who thought
the Convention merely required a determination of whether the En-
glish Courts "acted reasonably [and] in good faith" in finding the
book obscene 297 or "whether the... task [was to] examine the School-
book directly in the light of the Convention and of nothing but the
Convention. "298
The Strasbourg Court, siding with those espousing the former
standard noted in the previous paragraph, determined that England
was allowed a "margin of appreciation" to find the book obscene in
view of English culture:
[I] t is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Con-
tracting States a uniform European conception of morals. The view
taken by their respective laws of the requirements of morals varies
from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era
which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of
opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continuous
contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are
in principle in a better position than the international judge to
give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well
as on the "necessity" of a "restriction" or "penalty" intended to
meet them.299
The Court did observe that this "margin of appreciation" was not
unlimited; it simply was not exceeded on the facts of the case.3 00 Fur-
ther, it has been used primarily in connection with Articles 8 through
11 (dealing with civil liberties rather than more basic human
rights). 301 These articles by their very structure allow some national
flexibility on what is or is not protected.3 2 It has never been applied,
however, to allow national variation on fundamental matters such as
the right to life (Article 2) and prohibition of torture (Article 3).
The concept of "margin of appreciation" does have its critics who
argue that it is often applied in an ad hoc manner, with little guidance
295. Convention, supra note 12, art. 10.
296. Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 740.
297. Id. at 753.
298. Id
299. Id. at 753-54.
300. Id. at 754.
301. Convention, supra note 12, arts. 8-11.
302. See discussion supra note 34 (detailing the structure of these articles).
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for the future.3 0 3 At least one respected judge on the Court called for
its abolition. 30 4 Despite the fact that it has been applied somewhat
more restrictively in recent years, 30 5 the concept still has its defenders,
including Paul Mahoney, Deputy Registrar of the Strasbourg Court,
who argues that it is necessary in order to prevent the Court from
overstepping its authority.3
0 6
Another somewhat related concept is the principle of "sub-
sidiarity."3 0 7 The idea of subsidiarity is that the primary enforcers of
human rights within each member state are the courts of that state30 8
and that the Strasbourg Court only plays a subsidiary role.30 9 Implicit
in this ordering of who has primary responsibility is the idea that each
member state must be granted at least some flexibility in applying the
principles enunciated in the Convention.3 1 0 In effect, this is another
way of expressing the notion that some variance in applicable norms is
permissible under the Convention. Though these two concepts imply
some amount of flexibility, they are not intended to suggest that any
303. See, e.g., Nicholas Lavender, The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation, 1997 EUR.
HuM. RTS. L. REv. 380 (1997).
304. Z v. Finland, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 371, 415 (1997) (De Meyer, J., dissenting in part).
305. This is a personal observation based on reading many cases relating to Articles 8
through 11, not the result of any systematic analysis.
306. Mahoney, Universality, supra note 255, at 369-71.
307. REID, PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 126, at 37.
308. Under Article 1 of the Convention, each member state has taken on the obliga-
tion to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms" set out in the
Convention. Convention, supra note 12, art. 1.
309. REID, PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 126, at 37.
310. See, e.g., MowBRAY Text, supra note 38, at 449-53; Paul Mahoney, Marvelous Rich-
ness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism, 1998 EUR. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 1 (1998) [here-
inafter Mahoney, Marvelous]. The doctrine might strike some American viewers as being
somewhat analogous to the views expressed by Justice Harlan on the application of the Due
Process Clause to state courts. Commentators on the Court have discussed the concept of
"subsidiarity" at some length. See, e.g., Mahoney, Universality, supra note 255, at 379. Never-
theless, the term has only been mentioned in a handful of majority opinions of the Court,
but without much elaboration on its meaning other than as a synonym for "margin of
appreciation." In the recent case of Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 18 (2002), the Court stated that "[i]n accordance with the principles of sub-
sidiarity, it is... primarily for the Contracting States to decide on the measures necessary
to secure Convention rights within their jurisdiction." Id. at 475. The Court then observed
that this means that "the Contracting States [i.e., signatories to the Convention] must en-
joy a wide margin of appreciation." Id. In Goodwin, however, the Strasbourg Court held that
the practice complained of-a refusal to alter a post-operative transsexual's birth certifi-
cate-was held to be beyond the applicable "margin of appreciation." Id. at 477. The Court
has also used the term in connection with the requirement that applicants for relief in the
Strasbourg Court must have first exhausted domestic law remedies: "[T] he principle of
subsidiarity ... requires the exercise of the legal channels of domestic law remedies."
Karatas & Sari v. France, App. No. 38396/97, 35 Eur. H.R Rep. 37, 31 (2002).
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member state can act in variance to a clearly expressed standard con-
tained in the Convention or in the decisions of the Court that inter-
pret the Convention. 311
C. The Convention Is an Evolving Document
On many occasions the Strasbourg Court has characterized the
Convention as a "living instrument," meaning that its provisions are
subject to changing interpretations under appropriate circum-
stances.3 12 In an early decision, Tyrer v. United Kingdom,3' 3 in outlawing
punishment by "caning" in a secondary school, the Court observed:
[T] he Convention is a living instrument which ... must be inter-
preted in the light of present-day conditions. In the case now
before it the Court cannot but be influenced by the developments
and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the mem-
ber States of the Council of Europe in this field.3 14
The concept has been repeated in many subsequent cases, 315 al-
though sometimes in a situation where the Court did not diverge from
earlier decisions. 316 But, on occasion, the Court has found that a re-
311. See Mahoney, Universality, supra note 255, at 369. Thus, once the Court deter-
mined that laws criminalizing homosexuality were contrary to Article 8 (Right to Privacy)
in the United Kingdom, see Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 168 (1981), it
applied the same determination to all member states-even Cyprus where, apparently,
there was great social opposition to the legalization of homosexuality. Modinos v. Cyprus,
App. No. 15070/89, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485, 488 (1993).
312. The position of the Strasbourg Court is, thus, similar to that expressed by Justice
Brennan on how the United States Constitution should be interpreted. See, e.g., Burnham
v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 630 (1990) (Brennan,J., concurring); Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137-41 (1989) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
313. 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 10 (1978).
314. Id. at 9-10.
315. See, e.g., L & V v. Austria, App. No. 39392/98, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55, 1033 (2003)
("[T]he Court has frequently held that the Convention is a living instrument, which has to
be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.") (emphasis added).
316. See, e.g., V. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24888/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 123
(2000) ("[T]he Convention is a living instrument, [thus] it is legitimate when deciding
whether a certain measure is acceptable under one of its provisions to take account of the
standards prevailing amongst the Member States of the Council of Europe."). But the
Court found that there was no "standards prevailing" on the issue before it-the minimum
age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult. Id. at 175. See also Pretty v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 34 (2002) ("While the Court must take a
dynamic and flexible approach to the interpretation of the Convention, which is a living
instrument, any interpretation must also accord with the fundamental objectives of the
Convention and its coherence as a system of human rights protection."). After this observa-
tion, the Court declined to decide that recent medical knowledge would justify allowing
someone suffering from a painful terminal illness to participate in the "assisted suicide." Id.
at 39. Occasionally a dissenting opinion will urge that, since the Convention is a "living
instrument," the Court majority ought to find that a particular applicant is entitled to
protection. See, e.g., Botta v. Italy, App. No. 21439/93, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 241, 253-55
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sult it had reached at an earlier time should no longer apply because
of changed conditions.31 7 No cases suggest that the Court would be
unwilling to do so in appropriate cases in the future. It may be diffi-
cult, however, to predict under which circumstances such a willing-
ness would exist since such a prediction apparently depends on a
determination of how "present-day conditions"31 8 may have changed
since the Court last looked at the issue in dispute. 319 Ultimately, it at
least raises questions about how the Court should determine the true
facts about present-day conditions, at least in situations where there is
serious conflict over what the true facts might be.3 20
(1998) (Loucaides, J., dissenting) (urging that Article 8, the Right of Privacy, be inter-
preted as a positive right, and thus Italy should be required to provide facilities for the
disabled at a public beach).
317. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, 447
(2002) (finding that a transsexual's Article 8 right to privacy was violated when the British
Government refused to alter her birth certificate from male to female). Twice in the previ-
ous fifteen years the Court had ruled to the contrary. Id. at 486 (noting the cases of Rees v.
United Kingdom, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1986), and Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep.
622 (1990)).
318. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 449.
319. In Goodwin, for example, while the change of policy was justified by changed cir-
cumstances, the Court admitted that none of the member states that were signatories to
the Convention had changed policies on birth certificate alteration. Id at 466. Rather, it
noted that changes had occurred elsewhere in the world, notably in Australia and New
Zealand, and that the British government's report detailing its inquiry into the issue sug-
gested that alteration in such circumstances should be permitted. Id. at 466-67. Parlia-
ment, however, had not enacted the proposals into law. Id at 465.
320. One possible future test of the Court's willingness to change with the times will be
the issue of the effect of airline noise on neighborhoods near airports. In Powell & Rayner
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9310/81, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355, 362-63, 366, 369 (1990), the
Strasbourg Court rejected a challenge, based on Article 8 (the right of privacy), that exces-
sive noise generated by flights at Heathrow Airport constituted a violation of Article 8. But
a decade later, a section of the Court in Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, 34
Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2001), found that late night flights constituted an invasion of privacy-
or, more accurately, a violation of the requirement to "respect... private and family life
[and] home." Id. at 3-4. In this case, however, the challenge was to "late night" flights, not
noisy flights in general. Id. at 25-26. The case was then taken to the Grand Chamber which
ruled that there had not been an Article 8 violation, but it also found that it was at least
"arguable" that a violation of Article 8 had occurred. Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No.
36022/97, 37 Eur. H.R Rep. 28, 645 (2003). Under these circumstances the Grand Cham-
ber held that pursuant to Article 13 Britain must provide an adequate method of domestic
challenge to environmental depredations in such cases. Id. at 646. The Grand Chamber
held that Britain did not have adequate provisions for such a challenge, and thus was in
violation of Article 13. Id. at 646. Five of the seventeen judges of the Grand Chamber
dissented on the Article 8 issue, claiming "that Article 8 embraces the right to a healthy
environment, and therefore to protection against pollution and nuisances caused by harm-
ful chemicals, offensive smells, agents which precipitate respiratory ailments, noise and so
on." Id. at 648-50. Given that the majority of the Grand Chamber expressed concerns over
British procedure, it is not hard to imagine that, if there is little change in substantive relief
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To an observer from the United States, it is curious how willingly
the Court and its member states have accepted the possibility of alter-
ing the coverage of the Convention in light of "changed circum-
stances." This is, of course, a matter of great controversy in the United
States. 321 Proponents of a flexible interpretation of the United States
Constitution argue that flexibility within the Supreme Court is neces-
sary because the Constitution is very difficult to amend to take into
account unique or novel situations involving constitutional interpreta-
tion.32 2 In contrast, in its fifty years of existence, the Convention has
been amended on a number of occasions utilizing a much simpler
process, by adoption of protocols that need not be adopted by all
member states at the same time.3 23 Further, the judges of the Human
Rights Court who determine whether "changed conditions" justify a
reinterpretation of the Convention are chosen by a much more de-
centralized and, in some cases, a more casual method than the choice
of Justices on the United States Supreme Court.3 24 Thus, to some de-
from the British government or its courts concerning this issue, a future decision from the
Court might find an Article 8 violation.
321. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 230, at 17-25.
322. Id. at 22-23 (noting that one of the three arguments that "non-originalists" ad-
vance for expansive interpretation of the Consitution is that the "cumbersome amendment
process" makes it impossible for the Constitution to "meet the needs of a changing
society").
323. See sources cited supra note 35. (Some Protocols address the reorganization of the
Convention or Court, but other Protocols, namely 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, and 13, deal with substan-
tive rights enforceable by the Court.). Each Protocol specifies how many member states
need to ratify it to become effective. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 35; Protocol 7, supra
note 35, art. 9(1) (providing that it shall be in force when seven member states ratify it).
But the substantive rights in a Protocol cannot be enforced against a member state that has
not ratified it. Id. art. 9(2). For a list of the member states that have ratified the various
protocols, see European Court of Human Rights, Dates of Ratification of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Additional Protocols, http://www.echr.coe.int (follow
"Basic Texts" hyperlink; then follow "Dates of Ratification of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Additional Protocols" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 19, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Ratification Dates].
324. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text, on the selection ofjudges for the
Human Rights Court, and criticism of the efficacy of the selection system. In the United
States, decisions on who should be appointed to the United States Supreme Court are
given enormous attention by elected officials (primarily the President who appoints, and
Senators who vote to confirm) because of the potential to "reinterpret" the Constitution
(and "reconsider" previously decided cases). Some have argued that this attention to who
should be appointed to the Supreme Court gives the Court greater legitimacy in flexible
interpretations of the Constitution. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT 4 (2001). In the Strasbourg Court, in some instances the decision to
reinterpret the existing case law to find a violation where, before, there was none, is done
by a Section Chamber of seven judges. By rule, one judge is from the country affected, but
the others are geographically dispersed. ECHR RULES, supra note 40, R. 25(2). In Hatton,
34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 1, the judges of the Section decision finding Britain had violated
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gree, this raises questions as to the legitimacy of the mandate of
judges of the Strasbourg Court to engage in reinterpretation of the
Convention as to matters of policy that might well be viewed differ-
ently by democratically elected officials. 325
D. The Convention Sometimes Imposes "Positive" Duties
The United States Constitution is almost exclusively a document
of authorization and limitation. The Constitution authorizes govern-
ment to undertake many activities, but it almost never requires ac-
tion.326 Most of the rest of the Constitution, however, is aimed at
prohibiting the government from acting in various ways, such as the
numerous prohibitions contained in the Bill of Rights, which protect
Article 8 (privacy) were French, Belgian, Lithuanian, Cypriot, and Czech. Id. See also COUN-
CIL OF EUR., EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTMTIES 2003, at 8 (2003),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "Reports" hyperlink; then follow "Survey of Ac-
tivities 2003" hyperlink) [hereinafter SURVEY OF ACTIVTIES 2003] (listing the judges at the
time the Hatton case was decided, by country). The British judge dissented. Hatton, 34 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 1, 35 (KerrJ., dissenting). Except for France, none of the countries represented
by the judges in the majority had a major international airport as significant as Heathrow
that might be adversely affected by the scope of the decision. Airports Council Int'l, Pas-
senger Travel 2004 Final, http://www.aci.aero/cda/aci/display/main/aci-content.jsp?zn=
aci&cp=1-5 9 2 (noting the relative importance of airports by volume and listing
London's airport as having the third largest volume and Paris's airport as having the sev-
enth largest volume in 2004, while failing to list a Belgian, Lithuanian, Cypriot, or Czech
airport). Further, France's main international airport, Charles de Gaulle, is located farther
away from populated areas than is Heathrow. Michelin, France, Atlas Routier et Touris-
tique 41-42 (2001); Ordinance Survey, Motoring Atlas, Britain, 22-23 (2003). Thus,
Charles de Gaulle airport was less likely to have its air traffic affected by the decision.
Indeed, restrictions on Heathrow might arguably work to the advantage of Charles de
Gaulle Airport in terms of international competitiveness.
325. There have been occasional suggestions in dissents that the Court should use
great care in reinterpreting the provisions of the Convention. See, e.g., Kroon v. Nether-
lands, App. No. 18535/91, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 263, 288 (1994) (Morenilla, J., dissenting)
("This principle of 'evolutive and creative' interpretation, which allows the Convention to
be adapted to the changing circumstances of our democratic societies, thus making it 'a
living instrument,' means however that in practice the Court is confronted with a difficult
dilemma: that 'of guarding against the risk of exceeding its given judicial role of interpre-
tation by overruling policy decisions taken by elected, representative bodies who have the
main responsibility in democratic societies for enacting important legislative changes,
whilst not abdicating its own responsibility of independent review of governmental ac-
tion.'") (footnotes omitted).
326. For example, U.S. CONsT. art. I, "authorizes" Congress to legislate on many topics,
but it only "requires" a very small number of actions by government, and they are mainly
organizational in nature, e.g., the taking of a periodic census, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, and
requiring the President to give a periodic "State of the Union" address to Congress, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3.
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a variety of activities from governmental interference.3 27 The Supreme
Court has been unwilling to read into the Constitution a judicially
enforceable obligation on the part of government to act to enforce
the provisions of the Constitution, at least in the absence of legisla-
tion. 328 A prime example is DeShaney v. Winnebago County3 29 where gov-
ernmental officials had received complaints that a child was being
abused by his father but had not removed him from his father's cus-
tody.330 The Supreme Court held that the state had no constitutional
duty to protect the child from his father even after receiving reports of
possible abuse.3 31
The Strasbourg Court has interpreted the Convention and the
duty of the Court much differently. In a number of instances, it has
held that a member state has a positive duty to undertake actions that
will enforce the protections to people granted by the Convention. In a
situation very similar to the DeShaney case, the Court determined in Z
327. The Bill of Rights, U.S. CONST. amends. I-X, prohibits Congress from interfering
with a variety of familiar freedoms of speech, religion, and unreasonable searches and
seizures, and it imposes restrictions on how government can conduct criminal trials. The
Bill of Rights is not the sole repository of prohibitions. The original Constitution contains
various prohibitions, such as outlawing Bills of Attainder. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 9. Other
amendments also restrict governmental power, such as the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
hibition on states depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Thirteenth Amendment, providing that "slav-
ery.., shall (not] exist within the United States" is the main substantive provision in the
Constitution that might be construed as a "positive" right, although Section 2 of the
Amendment merely gives Congress "the power to enforce" this Amendment rather than
requiring it to do so. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
328. The biggest exception to the obligation of the government to act to enforce the
provisions of the Constitution is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), requiring that
counsel be provided to indigent criminal defendants pursuant to the right to counsel pro-
vision of the Sixth Amendment.
329. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
330. Id. at 192-93. The local social services agency had received complaints on several
occasions and had made ineffectual efforts to intervene. Eventually, the child was so se-
verely injured by beating that he became permanently retarded due to brain injuries. Id.
331. Id. at 195-96 ("[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself re-
quires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by
private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to de-
prive individuals of life, liberty, or property without 'due process of law,' but its language
cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that
those interests do not come to harm through other means. Nor does history support such
an expansive reading of the constitutional text. Like its counterpart in the Fifth Amend-
ment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent
government 'from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppres-
sion,' ...... Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State
protected them from each other. The Framers were content to leave the extent of govern-
mental obligation in the latter area to the democratic political processes.").
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v. United Kingdom3 2 that a member state had violated the Convention
provision prohibiting torture and inhumane and degrading treat-
ment3 33 when it allowed children to live in an abusive situation for
over four years before removing them from their home.3 34 The Court
reiterated that:
Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of demo-
cratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. The obligation on High Con-
tracting Parties [member states] under Article 1 of the Convention
to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and free-
doms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, re-
quires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals
within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by
private individuals. These measures should provide effective pro-
tection, in particular, of children and other vulnerable persons and
include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the au-
thorities had or ought to have had knowledge. 335
Z v. United Kingdom is one of a number cases where the Court has
found that a member state has positive duties under the Convention.
The Court has found that Article 2 (every person's right to life shall
be protected by law) imposes positive duties on the member states to
take steps to prevent police or other activities which may endanger
life.3 36 The Court has also held that "Article 2 should be interpreted as
including a procedural element, namely, the provision of an effective
procedure after the event for establishing the facts."3 3 7
The Court has also found that positive duties exist under Article 8
("[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life
332. App. No. 29392/95, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3 (2002). The Court also reached the same
result based on somewhat similar facts in A v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25599/94, 27 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 611 (1998).
333. Convention, supra note 12, art. 3.
334. Z v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 98.
335. Id. The Court also found a violation of Article 13 of the Convention: "Everyone
whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effec-
tive remedy before a national authority" inasmuch as the British law did not provide for a
tort action for the failure to prevent the abuse. Id. at 129-30. The Court also determined
that the four children were entitled to "just satisfaction" under Article 41 in the aggregate
amount of £320,000 for the damages suffered by governmental neglect. Id. at 145. See supra
Part II.B.3 (discussing "just satisfaction").
336. See McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 138
(1996) (finding that a member state must "adopt clear and detailed rules on the use of
lethal force which should strictly control and limit its use in accordance with the Conven-
tion provision" and when the "relevant domestic law is vague and general [it is a] violation
of Article 2").
337. Id. at 138; accord Kaya v. Turkey, App. No. 22729/93, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 46
(1998).
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[and] his home").338 In Lopez Ostra v. Spain,3 3 9 the Court found that it
was a violation of Article 8 when the government failed to intervene
and shut down a private waste water treatment plant that emitted
fumes and loud noises near the Lopez Ostra home.3 40 While noting
that the plant served a public good, the Court stated: "the State did
not succeed in striking a fair balance between the interest of the
town's economic well-being-that of having a waste-treatment plant-
and the applicant's effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her
home and her private and family life." 341 It would not be surprising if,
in the future, the Court were to find positive duties in other circum-
stances under these Articles or other Articles.3 42
IV. The Future of the European Court of Human Rights
The Strasbourg Court has become a victim of its own success. It
has received an increasing flood of applications seeking relief and is
finding it increasingly difficult to keep up with the caseload.3 43 Almost
from the beginning it has taken a long time between the triggering
event and a final decision by the Court. When it was a two-tier process,
with proceedings in a Commission before an appeal could be made to
the Court, it sometimes took the better part of a decade between the
triggering event and the Court's final decision, and by then, in some
cases, no truly effective relief was available.3 44 In other words, as the
clich6 goes, justice delayed is justice denied.
338. Convention, supra note 12, art. 8.
339. App. No. 16798/90, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277 (1994).
340. Id. at 289-90. The waste water plant served several local leather tanneries, and
while it was privately owned, it had been built with a municipal subsidy on leased municipal
land. Id, see also Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357 (1998) (reach-
ing a similar result). In Moreno Gomez v. Spain, App. No. 4143/02, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16,
2004), available at HUDOC search, supra note 2 (searching for App. No. 4143/02), Spain
was found liable for violating Section 8 because it allowed a loud discotheque to operate in
an "acoustically saturated zone," which included the applicant's residence and the appli-
cant was awarded almost C4,000 for soundproofing and past nuisance. Id.
341. Lopez Ostra, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 297; see also Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No.
36022/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 22-23 (2002). In Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No.
28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2002), the Court found a positive obligation under Article
8 (and also Article 12-the right to marry) "to ensure the right of the applicant, a post-
operative male to female transsexual, to respect for her private life, in particular through
the lack of legal recognition given to her gender re-assignment." Id. at 447-48.
342. See generally ALASTAIR MowBRAV, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE ECHR BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2004) (providing a compre-
hensive review of the Court's decisions finding positive duties).
343. Wildhaber, Oslo Speech, supra note 154, at 1-2.
344. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Austria, App. No. 12875/87, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293 (1993). In
Hoffman, pursuant to a divorce proceeding, the Austrian courts gave custody of the chil-
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A. Structural Reforms to Ameliorate the Growing Caseload Crunch
The Strasbourg Court and its parent organization, the Council of
Europe, have been well aware of the huge problem of increasing num-
bers of cases with which the Court must deal. 345 During the Court's
early years, it had only a small number of cases to decide, but today it
considers many thousands of cases and issues hundreds of judg-
ments.3 46 Part of the increase is due to the expansion in the number
of countries that are member states of the Convention, and part of the
increase is due to increased awareness of citizens of member states of
the opportunity to seek relief from the Court.
In addition, expansive interpretations of the scope of the Con-
vention very likely add to the volume of cases. One such interpreta-
tion involves cases brought under Article 8 involving un-remediated
environmental problems, such as in Lopez Ostra v. Spain.3 47 The Court
in Lopez Ostra indicated that member states have positive duties to take
dren to the father in 1986. Id. at 298. In 1994 the Strasbourg Court decided that Austria
had improperly used religion as a factor in deciding the custody issue. Id. at 312. By then
the children were age twelve and fourteen and had not lived with their mother for eight
years. See generally id. In United Communist Party of Turk. v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26
Eur. H.R. Rep. 121 (1998), the managers and founders of the party were barred in 1991
from serving in leadership posts in any other political party. Id. at 126. It was not until 1998
that the Strasbourg Court ruled this was a violation of the Convention, thus allowing them,
once again, to participate in politics. Id. at 137.
345. See EVALUATION GROUP REPORT, supra note 251, at Preface; see also Wildhaber, Oslo
Speech, supra note 154, at 2.
346. SURVEY OF AcTrVTlEs 2004, supra note 59, at 35. In 2004 the Court had 40,943
applications lodged, considered 21,181 registered applications alleging violations of the
Convention, declared 20,350 applications inadmissible, and issued 718 decisions. Id. In
2004 there were almost 10,000 more applications lodged than in 2001, the first full year of
the operation of the reconstituted Court and almost 23,000 more applications lodged than
in 1998, the year that the Court was initially reconstituted. Id. As of the end of 2003, 37,281
applications were pending that had not yet been considered by the Court. Id. At the end of
2004, this number had increased by 11,331, over 30%, to 48,612. Id. At the current pace of
decision making, it would take over two years to work off the backlog even if no new cases
were filed. If the annual increase of unresolved applications were to continue at the same
pace for the next three years, the backlog would reach 82,605 unresolved cases by the end
of 2007-which would take four years to resolve. Thus most cases filed during 2008 would
not even be considered until 2012.
It is probably unrealistic to assume that the annual number of applications will remain
at the 2004 level, and while some increase in the number of dispositions may be antici-
pated once Protocol 14, supra note 66, is finally adopted, its effective date may be many
months, if not years, from now. See infra note 370. But, the reforms envisioned by Protocol
14 may produce only a modest increase in the number of applications resolved each year.
See infra notes 359-63 and accompanying text. So, the doleful scenario suggested in the
previous paragraph may be unduly optimistic.
347. App. No. 16798/90, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277 (1995).
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steps to reduce or eliminate such problems.3 48 At present, the scope
of this right is not spelled out, but it will likely become a major source
of litigation before the Strasbourg Court. This may be particularly so
in some of the newer member states where old regimes were careless
(or worse) in terms of environmental protection. 349
While no Court decisions exist (yet) involving workplace protec-
tion, one can easily envision that Article 2 (everyone's right to life
shall be protected by law) might well be invoked to require govern-
mental intervention to improve workplace safety, at least in dangerous
industries such as mining and construction. Again, it is in the newer
member states that such problems are likely to be most acute. Given
that the Court regards the Convention as an "evolving document, 350
the possibility of expansive interpretations of other Articles of the
Convention is reasonable.
In sum, the Court has been and will continue to be confronted
with a serious problem because of the growing volume of cases it must
decide, and the problem will, almost undoubtedly, get worse. In 2000,
a three-person Evaluation Group (including the President of the
Court) was set up by the Council of Europe, and it filed a fairly com-
prehensive report on the problem making a number of suggestions.3 51
Many of the suggestions sounded similar to methods used by courts of
last resort in the United States. The Evaluation Group suggested at
least some discretionary authority on the part of the Court to reject
cases (or at least treat them in summary fashion) if they "raise an issue
that is, in the view of the Court, of ... minor or secondary impor-
tance."352 It also suggested creating a mechanism to remit (or re-
348. See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
349. Chernobyl is perhaps the most prominent example. See, e.g., Radiological Devices:
Weapons of Mass Dislocation, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2002, at 28, 28 (noting that the Chernobyl
nuclear accident in Ukraine in 1986 pumped vastly more radioactive material into the
atmosphere than any imaginable "dirty bomb").
350. See supra Part III.C.
351. EVALUATION GROUP REPORT, supra note 251. In its conclusion, the Report of the
Evaluation Group characterized the situation faced by the Court as "so serious that, if it is
to remain effective ... action is needed on several fronts." Id. para. 99. Earlier in its report,
the Evaluation Group observed that:
the point has been reached at which a difficult choice has to be made: either the
Court continues to attempt to deal in the same way with all the applications that
arrive (in which event it will slowly sink), or it reserves detailed treatment for
those cases which, in the light of its overall object and purpose ... warrant such
attention.... [U]nreservedly, the Group opts for the second alternative.
Id. para. 92.
352. Id. In terms of the present caseload, it is possible that the Court is already exercis-
ing discretion in deciding whether to take cases which seem to present issues of "minor or
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mand) cases back to national authorities for reconsideration; that
"senior officials" of the Registrar's office be given power to decide pro-
cedural issues or that independent persons be appointed with 'judi-
cial status" to carry out many of the duties currently undertaken by a
judge-rapporteur or by the three judges who make up the various
committees of the Court.35
3
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe then set up
internal review committees to consider the Evaluation Group report
and recommendations. 354 After two and a half more years of internal
review and reports, in 2004, the Committee of Ministers adopted Pro-
tocol 14 and circulated it for member state approval.3 55 Protocol 14
incorporated only some of the Evaluation Group's recommenda-
tions.356 It provides that a single judge initially screen cases for admis-
sibility instead of a three-judge committee; it allows a three-judge
committee (instead of a sevenjudge Chamber) to render a judgment
on the merits of a case "if the underlying question in the case, con-
cerning the interpretation or the application of the Convention... is
already the subject of well established case-law of the Court"; and it
permits the Court to declare an application inadmissible where "the
secondary importance." The vast majority of applications filed are rejected as being " 'man-
ifestly ill-founded'" (the term used when a case is rejected by a Committee). Id It may be
that many of the applications are made by individuals who have no knowledge of the scope
of the Court's jurisdiction, but it would seem probable that many of the applications are
made with the assistance of a lawyer who is acquainted with the relevant provisions of the
Convention and would be unlikely to file an application that had no chance of succeeding.
So, it is at least surprising that the ratio of summary rejection is so high. Further, I have
been told by lawyers familiar with the Court that they have seen applications that did ap-
pear to present serious issues but which were, nevertheless, rejected as "manifestly ill-
founded." Since rejected applications are not easily accessible for public inspection, it is
impossible to determine whether this is a systematic occurrence or are isolated events-or
are simply mistakes of the observers as to whether the rejected applications are, in fact,
meritorious. Thus, at best there is only a suspicion that there is at least some exercise of
discretion in deciding whether the Court will consider a case.
353. Id para. 98. The first two suggestions roughly parallel the discretionary power of
the Supreme Court to deny certiorari and to remand (with instructions) for reconsidera-
tion. The third resembles the power of federal judges to appoint magistrate judges to deal
with lesser matters. The Evaluation Group made many other detailed suggestions not re-
counted here. See generally id.
354. See Explanatory Report, Protocol 14, supra note 94, paras. 20-32.
355. Protocol 14, supra note 66, art. 18; see Council of Eur., Protocol No. 14 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending
the Control System of the Convention, Treaty open for Signature by the Member States
Signatories to Treaty ETS 5, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.
asp?NT=194&CM=10&DF=22/08/2005&CL=ENG [hereinafter Protocol 14, Signatories].
356. Compare Explanatory Report, Protocol 14, supra note 94 (noting all recommenda-
tions made by the Evaluation Group), with Protocol 14, supra note 66 (providing the rec-
ommendations incorporated).
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applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage," unless the issue
has not been duly considered by a tribunal of the defendant member
state. 357 Protocol 14 also provides that judges will serve a nine year
nonrenewable term.3 58
The provisions authorizing use of a single judge to reject applica-
tions lacking merit and three-judge committees to decide repetitive
cases will help somewhat in dealing with the burgeoning caseload. Un-
fortunately, it appears likely to improve things only marginally.
Granted, this reduces the collective amount of time judges spend on
admission decisions and repetitive case decisions, thereby allowing
judges more time to deal with more important matters. But as to ad-
mission decisions, it may be little more than regularizing what might
go on under the present system. It may well be that the great bulk of
the current admissibility decisions are made almost entirely on the
basis of the recommendations of the deputy registrar assigned to the
case, and by the position taken by the judge "rapporteur 359 who ini-
tially handles the case.3 60 If so, not a great deal of time is saved. Some-
what similarly, as to repetitive cases, even if they make up as much as
357. Protocol 14, supra note 66, arts. 6-8, 12.
358. Id. art. 2 (amending Article 23 of the Convention). The Protocol No. 14 Explana-
tory Report, supra note 94, has no explanation as to why the single term provision was
included in the Protocol, and it would seem to have relatively little to do with improving
efficiency of the Court, which is the stated purpose of the Protocol. Protocol 14, supra note
66, pmbl. There are rationales that might support this change. It probably takes a new
judge a year or two to get up to speed as a member of the Court. It would be inefficient to
have a judge serve only six years (the length of a single term). The current terms are
renewable so in a second term the judge would be much more efficient, but this may well
compromise his or her independence, since the nomination for renewal must come from
the member state for whom he or she sits. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Thus,
there may be a tendency to rule for the member state to ensure renomination. An addi-
tional factor is that, for judges from Eastern Europe, the pay of a judge on the Court is
probably much higher than ajudge or lawyer in his or her home country so there might be
a pecuniary reason to remain on the Court for additional terms, which also may have the
tendency to rule for the member state. (Although judges are well paid, see supra note 79
and accompanying text, a lawyer in Western Europe, who is of the caliber that a Human
Rights Court judge should be, can earn much more in practice.) See also supra note 82 and
accompanying text (noting that the Assembly of the Council of Europe endorsed this
change in order "to ensure the independence and impartiality of [the] judges").
359. See supra note 113-17 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
rapporteur).
360. Though speculation, this seems typical behavior of committees required to make
a large number of decisions. Of course, if each judge of the current Committees of the
Court spends a great deal of time independently reviewing all of the case files (as opposed
to carefully reviewing only those with special situations) rather than accepting recommen-
dations of the rapporteur or staff member, it would suggest that the judges themselves
consider such a thorough review as a critical function of the Court and further suggests
that the streamlining of the decision process contained in Protocol 14 is ill-advised.
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sixty percent of the current caseload,361 the amount of time deciding
them (if the case law is truly clear and there are no unusual factors)
should be a far smaller percentage of judge time.3 62
In sum, though the proposals appear laudable, they do not seem
to provide a real answer to the problem facing the Court.3 63 The origi-
nal Evaluation Group suggestions 364 were somewhat more far-reach-
ing. They envisioned that the Court would have the power to simply
remand cases to member state courts and to decline to hear cases that
raise relatively minor issues-at least until it appeared that some gui-
dance was required from the Court.365 The peculiar relation of the
Court to the member states may make it impossible to establish an
effective method of remand, and there is a real political reluctance to
restrict access to the Court.3 66 As such, perhaps the changes incorpo-
rated in Protocol 14 are all that are politically possible at this time.
More far reaching reforms, politically impossible at this time, may
have to wait until the Court has sunk deeper in the morass of cases
pending but unheard.
One additional point needs comment. Not only does the Court
often take years to complete a case, but the process of reform has itself
occupied several years with no end in sight. In November 2000, a Eu-
ropean Ministerial Conference on Human Rights voiced concern
about the ever-increasing volume of applications to the Strasbourg
Court and its ability to function effectively; and as a consequence an
Evaluation Group was formed to study the matter.367 After over three
361. Explanatory Report, Protocol 14, supra note 94, para. 68.
362. If a case is truly "repetitive" involving no new issues of law or fact, it would seem
that the draft of appropriate opinions could easily be prepared by lawyers in the Registrar's
office and simply presented to the judges for adoption. I have no information as to
whether this is the way matters are handled, in fact.
363. Even the fairly modest reforms proposed were criticized by some observers of the
Court. See, e.g., Dembour, supra note 134, at 622-23; Beernaert, Protocol 14, supra note 250,
at 555-57 (arguing in each that the changes undermine the fundamental right of individ-
ual petition). Technically speaking, these critics may be correct, but it is impossible to
imagine how forty-six judges, even if assisted by 205 staff lawyers, see Registry Role supra
note 159, will be able to consider thoroughly, let alone adjudicate fairly, every single case
that may arise from a population of 800 million. Something has to give.
364. See supra note 353 and accompanying text. The President of the Court has stated
that the reforms of Protocol 14 do not offer a long term solution. Wildhaber, Oslo Speech,
supra note 154.
365. EVALUATION GROUP REPORT, supra note 251, paras. 92-93, 96.
366. Explanatory Report, Protocol 14, supra note 94, paras. 77-83; see supra note 356;
see also Council of Eur., Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion No. 251 (2004), para. 11,
available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/
AdoptedText/ta04/EOP1251 .htm.
367. EVALUATION GROUP REPORT, supra note 251, paras. 1-2.
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years of internal considerations, the Committee of Ministers adopted
Protocol 14 and submitted it to the various member states for ratifica-
tion.368 Some states have already ratified it, but the ratification must
be unanimous. 369 Failure of even a single member state to ratify it
promptly will delay its implementation by many months or even sev-
eral years °70 As a consequence, whatever reform does occur may well
be close to a decade after the need was perceived.
B. The Caseload Problem May Be Far Worse than Officially
Recognized
The work of the Evaluation Group and of the Steering Commit-
tee outlined earlier is based on an analysis of caseload trends already
experienced by the Court and of existing problems of "repetitive"
cases. The number of states that have become members of the Con-
vention, however, has increased substantially in the last few years, and
a number have become members since 2001, the date of the Evalua-
tion Group report.3 71 One cannot overemphasize the potential of fu-
ture cases resulting from the admission of the newer member states as
a major factor in the continuing increases in the caseload of the
Court. At present the number of judgments against the recently ad-
mitted states is not great,3 72 but this number may escalate.
368. Protocol 14, supra note 66, arts. 18-19.
369. Protocol 14, Signatories, supra note 355.
370. As of September 2005, all but Russia and Bulgaria had signed Protocol 14, but
only fifteen member states had actually ratified it to date. Id. For a number of member
states, more than a year has elapsed since the signing occurred without having completed
the ratification. Id. Nevertheless, some observers hope that the ratification process will be
completed within the next year or two. Wildhaber, Oslo Speech, supra note 154, at 2. The
more controversial changes that had been suggested by the Evaluation Group Report were
not included in Protocol 14, see supra note 356, so there is little likelihood of principled
opposition to the changes. Still, it is possible that the delay inherent in the current very
slow process of the Strasbourg Court in deciding cases may be to the advantage of some
countires with a large number of cases against them, hence there may be little incentive to
deal quickly with ratification. Other more pressing domestic matters may put the ratifica-
tion process on a slow track, especially in countries experiencing internal crises, such as
Ukraine and Bosnia. However, the observers of the Court do expect Protocol 14 eventually
will be ratified by all member states. Confidential Sources, supra note 23.
371. Ratification Dates, supra note 323. There have been fourteen new members in the
last decade, 1995-2005, including four in the last three years, 2003-2005. Id.
372. The number of judgments as of the end of 2004 against the ten most recently
admitted member states (Serbia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Russia, Georgia, Latvia,
Moldova, Ukraine, and Croatia, id.) is very small-only eighty-four for the three-year pe-
riod of 2002-04. SURVEY OF AcrIVITIEs 2004, supra note 59, at 38-39. For comparison, for
the same three-year period there were 474judgments against Italy, 219 against France, and
287 against Turkey. Id. However, during the same three year period, 31,237 applications
were filed against the newest ten states. Id at 36-39. In comparison, 24,102 applications
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Most of the member states are, at best, emerging democracies
and several have a recent history of violence and repression.3 73 Tur-
key, a long time member, has had an enormous number of cases
before the Court because of the conflicts involving Kurdish separatist
activities and the efforts of the Turkish government to deal with this
situation.374 There is a distinct possibility of numerous cases arising
out of the conflict in Chechnya since Russia is now a member state. 375
There has been turmoil in Georgia and the Ukraine and an intermit-
tent undeclared war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the
Karabakh enclave. 376 There are separatist movements in Moldova and
in Macedonia; 377 there have been recent conflicts in Croatia and even
more conflicts in one of the newest members, Bosnia-Herzegovina.3 78
In all of these situations, the possibility of a large amount of litigation
were filed against France, Italy, and Turkey during the same period. Id. Given the serious
backlog of cases it is likely that most of the applications from the newest ten states simply
have not reached the decision stage-likely the most labor-intensive stage of adjudication.
It would not be surprising if the percentage of serious human rights violations in these
then newest member states is higher than France, for example.
373. See, e.g., Croatia's Serbs: Stormy Memories, ECONOMIST, July 30, 2005, at 45, 45 (noting
repression of Serbs in Croatia); Kosovo's Future: Waiting Game, ECONOMIST, July 9, 2005, at
43, 43 (noting problems in Kosovo); Moldova and Transdniestria: Gangsters Cornered, ECONO-
MIST, July 2, 2005, at 46, 46 (noting lawlessness and corruption in Moldova); Nagorno-
Karabakh: Small War, Big Mess, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2004, at 54, 54 (noting violence and
repression in Azerbaijan); Terrorism in Dagestan: The Language of Bombs, ECONOMIST, July 9,
2005, at 44, 44 (noting repression in Chechnya and other parts of the Caucasus region of
Russia).
374. See SuRvEy OF ACTIVITIES 2003, supra note 324, at 36-38.
375. The Court recently decided three cases involving six applicants arising out of the
Chechnya conflict finding Russia liable for deaths caused in the fighting of rebels. See, e.g.,
Khashiyev & Akayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00 (Eur. Ct. H. R., June 7,
2005), available at HUDOC search, supra note 2 (searching for App. No. 57942/00 and
repeating process for 57945/00); Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, App. Nos
57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00 (Eur. Ct. H. R., June 7, 2005), available at HUDOC
search, supra note 2 (searching for App. No. 57947/00 and repeating process for 57948/00
and 57949/00); Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00 (Eur. Ct. H. R.,June 7, 2005), availa-
ble at HUDOC search, supra note 2 (searching for App. No. 57950/00). The six applicants
were awarded a total of C140,000 as damages (C23,000 costs). Khashiyev, at para. 193;
Isayeva, Yusupova & Bazayeva, at paras. 246, 252; Isayeva, at paras. 236, 240. The potential
for thousands of cases, each one presenting different facts to be determined as to liability
and as to 'just satisfaction" damages seems very realistic. See, e.g., Chechnya's Disappeared: The
War After the War, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2005, at 53, 53; The North Caucasus: An Empire's
Fraying Edge, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2005, at 21, 21.
376. See Nagorno-Karabakh: Small War, Big Mess, supra note 373, at 54.
377. See Moldova and Transdniestria: Gangsters Cornered, supra note 373, at 46. Taming the
Balkans: Could EU Accession Do the Trick?, ECONOMIST, July 25, 2005, at 8, 8.
378. See Croatia's Serbs: Stormy Memories, ECONOMIST, July 30, 2005, at 45, 45. Peace in Our
Time, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2004, at 4, 4 (noting that peacekeeping forces are still needed
in Bosnia).
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before the Court is plausible. Serbia has just become a member
state, 379 and thus Kosovo (as well as Serbia itself) may become the
source of numerous cases in the future.
Perhaps the greatest potential for increases in the caseload of the
Court is in the area of prison conditions in recently admitted member
states. A recent case, Kalashnikov v. Russia,3 80 found that conditions in
a particular Russian prison were in violation of Article 3 of the Con-
vention.38 1 As explained below, there may be many thousands, if not
hundreds of thousands, of potential violations of the Convention. 382 A
couple of preliminary points need to be noted in order to fully ex-
plain why the problem may be so severe.
First, as set out earlier, a basic principle of the Convention is that
the standards in the Convention are applied with equal force as to
each member state. 383 Prison conditions have to meet a certain stan-
dard to avoid being in violation of Article 3 in England, Germany, and
France, and meet the same standard to avoid being a violation in Rus-
sia, Armenia, and Albania. There are, of course, two ways in which the
Court could deal with this. First, it could find that the standards for
prison conditions that satisfy Article 3 of the Convention are not
nearly as high as those that prevail in Western member states,3 84 and
379. See Ratification Dates, supra note 323 (noting Serbia's ratification on March 3,
2004).
380. App. No. 47095/99, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (2002).
381. See Convention, supra note 12, art. 3 (prohibiting torture). In egregious cases
where life may be endangered, even Article 2, providing that the right to life shall be
protected by law, might apply. Id. art. 2. The Court previously had found a violation of
Article 3 because of prison conditions in a handful of other cases arising in Western Eu-
rope, but mainly because the person was being held under conditions that were not appro-
priate for his or her specific condition, such as someone mentally disturbed being held in
solitary confinement. See, e.g., Keenan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27229/95, 33 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 913, 961-65 (failure to properly supervise mentally ill prisoner who then com-
mitted suicide); see also Peers v. Greece, App. No. 28254/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1192,
1218-19 (2001) (improper housing of convicted foreign national while undergoing drug
detoxification treatment); see also Price v. United Kingddom, App. No. 33394/96, 34 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 1285, 1293-94 (2001) (degrading treatment of severely handicapped wheelchair
bound prisoner in a facility not equipped for disabled). Kalashnikov v. Russia was the first
case to find an Article 3 violation in a case involving an ordinary prisoner held in an ordi-
nary prison. Kalashnikov, App. No. 47095/99, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 611 (2002). According
to the opinion, the conditions in Kalashnikov were quite brutal. Id. at 609-11.
382. See infra notes 389-95 and accompanying text.
383. See discussion supra Part III.A.
384. If the Strasbourg Court were to take this approach, one of the possible conse-
quences would be for a Western European country to decide to reduce the quality of its
prisons to the new level specified as satisfactory by the Court, possibly to save money or
possibly to make sure prisons better serve a "retribution" function, which the electorate of
the country might think appropriate.
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that if conditions are only somewhat better than those found in the
Kalashnikov case, they are not in violation of Article 3. If so, while
there may still be many cases in Eastern Europe that are not in com-
pliance, it may not take a great deal of effort for the member states to
rectify the deficiencies. It would seem more likely, however, that the
Court would find that the existing prison conditions in Western Eu-
rope are at or close to the minimum level of satisfactory conditions
required to avoid a violation of Article 3. If the Court were to find this,
then, as described later, the problems with compliance for the more
easterly member states are much more severe.3 8 5
Second, another basic principle of the operation of the Conven-
tion is that the primary enforcement of the requirements of the Con-
vention is supposed to be in the national courts of the member
states. 386 Recourse to the Strasbourg Court is permitted only if the
member state courts improperly deny relief or do not provide an ef-
fective domestic procedure to protect the rights guaranteed by the
Convention.3 8 7 A corollary principle, in theory at least, is that once a
member state has been informed of the violations of the Convention,
its domestic courts will ensure that the violations are remedied with-
out the need of further decisions from the Strasbourg Court. This as-
sumes, however, that a national court will be able to handle whatever
litigation ensues in a fair manner and issue adequate relief. And if the
national courts do not, then the Strasbourg Court has the power and
arguably, an obligation to take jurisdiction of such cases.3 88
Assuming that the Court would require prison conditions to be
close to the minimum standards used in Western Europe, and assum-
ing that the more recently admitted member state courts are unable
to carry out the necessary reforms, the deluge of cases that would have
to be dealt with by the Court would become truly enormous. Russia
alone has in excess of 800,000 prisoners, and a recent report funded
by the European Commission suggests that many, if not most, Russian
prisoners are jailed in conditions resembling those found to be in vio-
385. To hold that the standards in Western Europe must be higher than those in East-
ern Europe would be a fundamental breach of the basic premises of the Convention, and it
seems unlikely that the Court would take this course. I raised this point with someone who
had long been involved with the Court, suggesting that a "margin of appreciation" might
be used to allow a differential treatment. The response was that this would be unthinkable
as it would undermine the Convention.
386. Convention, supra note 12, art. 35(1).
387. Id. arts. 1, 35(1).
388. Id arts. 1, 35(1), 37 (indicating there is no discretion in the process).
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lation of the Convention in Kalashnikov.3s9 Ten percent of the prison-
ers suffer from virulent forms of tuberculosis and are often untreated
and not segregated from other prisoners. HIV is rampant.390 If only
ten percent of the prisoners seek relief from the Court, it would con-
stitute a tripling of the caseload from this one source alone. If half
seek relief, the caseload volume would be staggering. Other recently
admitted member states have a combined population half of that of
Russia, and probably have another 200,000 to 300,000 prisoners. 3
9 1
Though there may be no similar detailed reports documenting prison
conditions in other newly admitted member states, it is not hard to
imagine that an additional substantial volume of prison condition
cases may be filed by prisoners in these countries.
Of course it is theoretically possible that the Court will find condi-
tions substantially below Western European standards acceptable, but
this seems unlikely. 392 The real problem, however, is that it may be
impossible, as a practical matter, for most recently admitted member
states to provide for prisons that even come close to meeting Western
European standards. Corruption is endemic. 39 3 The democratic cre-
389. Kalashnikov v. Russia, App. No. 47095/99, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (2002); Moscow
Helsinki Group, Situation of Prisoners In Contemporary Russia, http://www.mhg.ru/en-
glish/1E7AF09 (follow "Personal Hygiene," "Food," "Premises," "Medical Services," "Disci-
pline and Punishment," and "Instruments of Restraint" hyperlinks) (last visited Aug. 25,
2005) (financed by the European Commission and containing detailed information about
poor Russion prison conditions) [hereinafter Russian Prisoners Report]. The population
of Russian prisons is found at the Moscow Center for Prison reform (MCPR) website. Mos-
cow Ctr. for Prison Reform, Reduction of Russia's Prison Population: Possibilities and Lim-
its, http://www.prison.org/english/rpsys_2.htm (showing 877,000 prisoners in 2003). In
the Kalashnikov case itself, the Russian government admitted that the conditions under
which Kalashnikov was held "did not differ from ... those of most detainees in Russian
prisons." Kalashnikov, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 607. The Government "acknowledged that, for
economic reasons, conditions of detention in Russia were very unsatisfactory and fell below
the requirements set for penitentiary establishments in other Member States of the Coun-
cil of Europe. However, the Government was doing its best to improve conditions of deten-
tion in Russia." Id.
390. Russian Prisoners Report, supra note 389; Moscow Helsinki Group, Tuberculosis
in Russian Prisons: Dying for Reform, http://www.mhg.ru/english/1FllE20 (last visited
Nov. 1, 2005); Moscow Helsinki Group, HIV/AIDS Prevention in Prisons in Russia, http://
www.mhg.ru/english/1F4F76C (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
391. Estimate based on Russian ratio of prisioners to population, translated to a similar
proportion using the other recently admitted member state populations.
392. It seems unlikely in that the Court would allow Western European countries to
drastically lower standards in prisons in order to save money or for some other reason
without violating the Convention.
393. See, e.g., Ukraine's Presidential Election: An Orange Victory, ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 2005, at
35, 35 (reporting on the recent election in Ukraine, noting that corruption has been ram-
pant). Transparency International prepares a periodic "Corruption Perceptions Index."
Transparency Int'l, Knowledge Centre: Corruption Surveys and Indexes, Corruption Per-
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dentials of some of the recent member states are questionable
at best.394 Thus, it seems unlikely that the governments of these
newer member countries would invest much energy in prison
reform.
3 95
Even if these countries could overcome the political constraints
imposed by a lack of a true democracy and the debilitating effects of
corruption and became genuinely interested in prison reform, this tri-
umph is probably fiscally impossible in the near future.3 96 Most West-
ern European countries have a gross domestic product of upwards of
$20,000 per capita, 397 an amount that, in several instances, is over ten
times the size of more easterly member states.398 Each of these eastern
member states has the daunting task of bringing its entire economy
ceptions Index 2004, http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2OO4/cpi2OO4.en.html#cpi2OO 4
(last visited Aug. 25, 2005). In 2004 it ranked most of the Eastern European countries near
the bottom of the index. Id. While Finland has a "score" of 9.7 (out of ten) and Western
Europe in general scored relatively high-in the six to nine range, Eastern European
countries were much lower-e.g., Russia with a "score" of 2.8, Ukraine with 2.2, and Azer-
baijan with 1.9. Id. Only a handful of third world countries scored lower. Id.
394. Azerbaijan recently held an "election" and a subsequent crackdown on dissidents
struck many western observers as very undemocratic. See Azerbaijan and Democracy: A
Watermelon Revolution?, ECONOMIST, June 4, 2005, at 52, 52. In the recent election in the
Ukraine the first result was so flawed that it led to the "orange" revolution-when masses
of citizens blockaded the streets, and eventually a new, fairer election was held. See discus-
sion supra note 393.
395. An exploration of the "political will" within recently admitted member states to
pursue genuine prison reform (let alone a demonstration that the political will is lacking)
is beyond the scope of this Article. But, the next factor considered-financing improve-
ments-is by itself a complete barrier for the foreseeable future.
396. See Poverty in Eastern Europe, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2000, at 27, 27 (detailing the
horrendous economic conditions in more rural parts of Eastern Europe, where living stan-
dards have declined since the demise of Communism and noting the daunting task ahead
for economic progress and the obstacles presented by disorganized and corrupt govern-
ment). While this report is several years old, there is little evidence of any marked improve-
ment. For example, hospitals in Russia are in dire straits due to massive under-funding and
neglect, so much so it is thought to be a major cause of a declining life span and a declin-
ing population. SeeJeanne Whalen, Russia's Health Care Is Crumbling, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13,
2004, at A9.
397. In 2003, for example, the estimated per capita gross domestic product of Ger-
many was $27,600, of France, $27,500, and of Italy, $26,800. 2005 WORLD ALMANAC, supra
note 7, at 112. Norway had a per capita gross domestic product of $37,700 and Switzerland,
$32,800 in the same year. Id.
398. The 2003 estimated per capita gross domestic product of Moldova was $1800, of
Georgia was $2500, and of Serbia was $2300. Id. at 803, 778, 827. These are all less than
10% of some of the Western European countries listed, supra note 397. It was $5300 in the
Ukraine. Id. at 840. Russia had a somewhat higher per capita gross domestic product at
$8900, but even this was less than a third of that of some western European countries. Id. at
823. A simple comparison of the per capita gross domestic product is not a perfect mea-
sure of the economic capacity of any country to provide governmental services. There may
be less income but wages (such as for prison guards) are also lower. There are, however,
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and social structure up to western standards. It takes money to provide
an emerging economy with a modern infrastructure, with modern fac-
tories, modem schools, modern hospitals, and with all of the other
hallmarks of an advanced western economy. Massive spending
projects aimed at modernizing prisons would divert funds from other
projects which may well be more important for that state's develop-
ment as a fully functioning western democratic country.399
In short, whatever the will may be for prison reform, the ability
may be lacking. One might ask what, as a policy matter, the Strasbourg
Court should do in a situation where there is massive poverty and a
decaying infrastructure. Russian prisons are appalling, but so, appar-
ently, are its hospitals. 40 0 Should the Court, as prison cases are
brought before it, attempt to enforce improvement by awarding sub-
stantial amounts of monetary damages (or, perhaps, increasing
amounts) as 'just satisfaction? ' 40 1 If Russia is saddled with many sub-
stantial 'just satisfaction" judgments with respect to its prisoners,
would this have an adverse effect on the ability of Russia to do some-
thing to improve its hospitals? 40 2 In the United States, substandard
prison conditions and insufficiently desegregated school districts have
many more demands for improvement of almost all aspects of the economies of these
countries.
399. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, TheJudicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 788
(1978) ("limits on government resources are no less applicable in the courtroom than
outside of it" and "[a] court cannot weigh the competing demands for government re-
sources to determine how much can be raised for the institutions, nor should it try to force
the legislature to raise the necessary money regardless of competing considerations"); Don-
ald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions,
1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1305 (1983) (observing that "funds appropriated for, say, improved
prison conditions may mean fewer funds for health care or welfare assistance or some
other need"). If this is a problem worthy of some concern in the wealthy United States, it
would be a much greater problem in a poor country such as Armenia or Moldova. I do not
mean to suggest that the status quo of miserable conditions is, or ought to be, considered
acceptable. Certainly some steps toward prison reform should be undertaken in even the
most economically deprived member states. All I suggest is that it may well be fiscally im-
possible for a long period of time (even if the will exists) to bring prison conditions up to
Western European standards in more easterly member states.
400. See Poverty in Eastern Europe, supra note 396, at 27.
401. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (discussing awards of "just satisfaction"). The issue
raised in this sentence raises the question whether 'Just satisfaction" awards that were in-
tentionally "substantial" in amount (or increasing in amount over time while noncompli-
ance continued-becoming in essence a form of punitive damages) could be used to goad
a member state into faster compliance. It would seem contrary to the language of Article
41, but insofar as I am aware, it has never been discussed by the Court or by commentators.
402. Article 2 of the Convention provides that "[e]veryone's right to life shall be pro-
tected by law." Convention, supra note 12, art. 2. Given that the Convention is interpreted
to impose "positive duties," the Court may well find that grossly substandard hospital care
is a violation of Article 2 at some future point. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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been subject of lawsuits, and judges have used all of the equitable pow-
ers of a court (including injunctions, appointment of special masters
and even day to day supervision of the prisons or school districts) to
institute reform.40 3 But the Strasbourg Court has neither the structure
nor the personnel to carry out a similar task to "reform" Eastern Euro-
pean prisons, health facilities, or other decaying institutions.404
403. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998) (describing in de-
tail litigation to improve prison conditions in the United States and the immense amount
of judicial time and resources required); JAMES, JR., ET AL., supra note 244, at 38-40. In
some cases the courts were aided by attorneys from the United States Department of Jus-
tice including conducting investigations of the underlying facts. See, e.g., In re Estelle, 516
F.2d 480, 482, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1975). In terms of remedies, Feeley and Rubin observe:
[F]ederal courts ended up promulgating a comprehensive code for prison man-
agement, covering such diverse matters as residence facilities, sanitation, food,
clothing, medical care, discipline, staff hiring, libraries, work, and education. The
decisions themselves, and often the resulting body of law, specify many require-
ments in what can be described, depending on one's perspective, as painstaking
or excruciating detail; the wattage of the light bulbs in the cells, the frequency of
showers, and the caloric content of meals are all part of the code that the federal
courts have promulgated.
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra, at 41. All of this requires a great deal of judicial time and a large
staff under judicial control to ensure that the court orders are, in fact, carried out. The
litigation to reform the Arkansas prison system is recounted in detail emphasizing the
amount of time spent by the judge from 1965 to 1982 (including personal inspections of
the prisons) as well as the massive amount of other resources required to accomplish the
task. Id. at 51-79. The judge, of course, was in Arkansas, not hundreds of miles away, and
Arkansas is a relatively small state, not a huge country such as Russia. As to school desegre-
gation, James & Hazard indicate that in some instances, to implement desegregation, the
court issued decrees of increasing detail and appointed special officials to monitor and
administer the decrees. JAMES JR., ET AL., supra note 244, at 38-40. In some cities the fed-
eral court became a virtual adjunct to the school board. Id. at 39. In Boston, the district
court issued 400 rulings on the administration of the school system. Id Needless to say,
each of these rulings required the judge to hear the request and the evidence upon which
the request was made and whatever evidence the opposition offered, in other words, a
huge expenditure of judicial time. See also Horowitz, supra note 399, at 1297 (noting the
complexity and time consuming character of judicial supervision, that often leads "to the
appointment of a special master, a monitor, a review committee, or, in more extreme
cases, a receiver to take over administration of an agency").
404. As discussed, supra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.3, the only remedies available to Stras-
bourg Court are a form of declaratory relief and limited monetary damages. The Court has
no injunctive powers, and, further, has very limited ability to determine relevant facts. See
supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text. It only has forty-six judges who, for decision
making purposes, sit in groups of seven, meaning at best six decision making bodies. See
supra note 97 and accompanying text. It is located in Strasbourg, France, far from the more
easternly parts of Europe where institutions that might be substandard are located, and the
Court may well have only one judge and a small number of Court personnel who could
even speak the local language. The Court has no provisions for appointing or supervising
.special masters" or other personnel who could supervise the carrying out of injunctive
decrees, even if it had the power to issue them. In short, the Court as it is currendy consti-
tuted simply has no ability to implement the kinds of "structural litigation" that has oc-
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It may well be that the flood of cases posited in the preceding
paragraphs will not come to pass. The ability of a prisoner, or some-
one acting on behalf of a prisoner, to bring the particular conditions
of his incarceration to the attention of the national courts, let alone
the Strasbourg Court, may be restricted for many reasons, not the
least of which is intimidation by the prison authorities. Kalashnikov
was a banker before his imprisonment and likely had friends who
could facilitate his application to the Court-but this is probably an
exceptional circumstance. 40 5 If only prisoners who have well placed
domestic connections can appeal successfully, then the flood of cases
may never occur.406 But if domestic restrictions on seeking review of
prison conditions are overcome, as one hopes they are, it may mean
that the Court will be deluged with meritorious applications for re-
lief.40 7 Further, the Court may not be able to do very much to effectu-
ate a massive change, however desirable it may be.40 8
Conclusion
Though this Article outlines some serious problems facing the
Strasbourg Court, the Convention and the Court that administers it
are an immense force for betterment of the human condition, not
only in Europe, but, by example, (sooner or later) throughout the
world. The Convention was founded by visionaries, and, to date, their
vision is being carried out. So, whatever its problems (a charitable
curred in the United States to solve massive problems such as unsatisfactory prisons. See
supra note 403. Even if the Court did have such powers, there is at least a serious question
of whether the cost "improvements" ordered by the Court for one set of institutions would
be achieved at the expense of other important public institutions starved of funds as a
result. See supra note 399.
405. Kalashnikov v. Russia, App. No. 47095/99, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, 593 (2002). If
only a small number of prison condition cases are filed, it does not mean that violations of
the Convention are not rampant in this respect. It may only mean that a mechanism for
effective enforcement of the Convention has not been perfected.
406. Of course if this is what occurs, there will be massive violations of the Convention,
but they will never come to the attention of the Strasbourg Court. Even if the Court real-
izes that this is the case, it still will not be able to do anything since it merely adjudicates
individual cases brought before it, and has no capacity or authority to undertake any kind
of "structural" litigation such as has happened in the United States. See supra Part II.C.
407. Prison conditions are just one example of a situation that may result in a massive
number of cases brought to the Court. In a poor and corrupt society, as exists in most of
the newly admitted states, there are probably many other actions (or inactions) by the state
that could be the basis of a case in the Court. Already mentioned as another issue are
environmental harms, especially if the jurisprudence of the Court "evolves" to recognize
state inaction to protect people from environmental harm. See supra notes 347-49 and
accompanying text. So might appalling hospital conditions. See discussion supra note 396.
408. See supra notes 393-404 and accompanying text.
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characterization might be that they are growing pains), the existence
of the Convention and the Strasbourg Court is a major achievement
for the entire world. Many of the problems today can be traced to
what some might call too hasty expansion of the membership of the
Council of Europe and, thus, the coverage of the Convention. It is
true that some of the most intractable problems that the Court will
face in the future come from more recently admitted member states,
and it is unlikely that anything the Court does will dramatically im-
prove the human rights conditions in those countries in the short run.
But, the alternative would be to leave the citizens of such countries
completely out of any workable human rights system. Thus, some im-
provement through the decision making process of the Strasbourg
Court is better than the alternative of nothing. Any description and
analysis of the Convention and the Strasbourg Court must recognize
this fundamental point.
That is not to suggest that the problems of the Strasbourg Court
can be ignored. The increasing caseload must be dealt with, because
not to deal with it is to eventually destroy the Court. It has been sug-
gested that getting the judiciaries of the various member states to deal
more forcefully with domestic violations of the Convention is a lauda-
ble goal, but one that may be very hard to enforce. 40 9 So far, only
timid recommendations have been made to increase the discretionary
powers to choose cases to be decided, and even these have received a
mixed reaction. 410 The Court has almost no enforcement powers-
making it almost impossible to deal with widespread institutional
409. EVALUATION GROUP REPORT, supra note 251, paras. 44-47. While I follow the Stras-
bourg Court more closely than do most legal scholars from the United States, I cannot
claim sufficient experience with the internal operations of the Court to allow me to recom-
mend systemic reforms. Even so, I suspect that for cases brought by many applicants, there
has been no plenary discussion by a member state court of the facts and the applicability of
the Convention to the case before it. If the Court had the power to remand applications to
the member states for such a determination, it might (at least some of the time) result in a
satisfactory resolution without further recourse to the Strasbourg Court.
410. See, e.g., Council of Eur., Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion No. 251 (2004), Draft
Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms Amending the Control Systems of the Convention para. 11, available at http://assem-
bly.coe.int/default.asp (follow the "documents" hyperlink; then search for and select
"Opinion 251 2004") (objecting to a proposed amendment to Article 35 of the Convention
granting the Court any discretion to reject applications if the applicant has not suffered a
significant disadvantage). But see supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text (suggesting
that it may well be that de facto, such discretion is already being exercised). In the past,
four applications out of five have been found "inadmissible" in that there is not even a
prima facie case that a violation of the Convention has occurred and in recent years the
same fate has occurred in over nineteen out of twenty applications. See SURVEY OF Acrrvi-
TIES 2004, supra note 59, at 35.
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problems, such as prison or hospital conditions. 411 It will take leader-
ship (and probably considerable financing) from the Council of Eu-
rope, or some other body such as the European Union, to address
these problems in the poorer member states of the Council.
It is hard to imagine the Court as presently structured being able
to have much of a systemic effect. The Court takes pride in the fact
that the Convention is interpreted as a living instrument. 412 Presuma-
bly most member states are satisfied with this interpretation. But ex-
pansive and evolving interpretations of the Convention put even
greater burdens on the Court in terms of caseload and attempts to
enforce judgments. Possibly some of the problems dealt with by evolv-
ing interpretations (such as increased oversight over environmental
conditions by deeming them violations of Article 8) might better be
dealt with by bodies that have legislative authority-such as the Coun-
cil of Europe-or even by further Protocols to the Convention on
such topics that have been agreed to by member states.
Whatever the future holds for the Strasbourg Court, knowledge
of its current jurisprudence is important for any lawyer with any in-
volvement in the global economy. It is my intention that this Article
will advance this understanding.
411. It can grant "just satisfaction" but on a case by case basis this is a small penalty for
a member state with serious institutional problems such as inhuman prison conditions. A
large monetary sanction against a member state struggling to modernize its infrastructure
would simply be counterproductive. See supra Part II.B.3.
412. See supra Part III.C (detailing that the Convention is an evolving document).
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Appendix I
The substantive provisions of the current Convention are set out
below.
4 13
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11
The governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of
Europe,
Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December
1948;
Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and
effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared;
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement
of greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by
which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further real-
isation of human rights and fundamental freedoms;
Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms
which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are
best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy
and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the
human rights upon which they depend;
Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are
like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ide-
als, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collec-
tive enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal
Declaration,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1 - Obligation to respect human rights
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention.
413. All articles and protocols of the Convention (as well as the Rules of Court) are on
the Court's website. For the protocols of the Convention, see European Court of Human
Rights, Basic Texts, http://www.echr.coe.int (follow "Basic Texts" hyperlink; then follow
"The European Convention on Human Rights and Additional Protocols" hyperlink; select
the desired language and follow the appropriate hyperlink). See Convention, supra note 12;
ECHR RULES, supra note 40.
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SECTION I - Rights and freedoms
Article 2 - Right to life
1 Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sen-
tence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this
penalty is provided by law.
2 Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contraven-
tion of this article when it results from the use of force which is no
more than absolutely necessary:
a in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
b in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a
person lawfully detained;
c in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection.
Article 3 - Prohibition of torture
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
Article 4 - Prohibition of slavery and forced labour
1 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2 No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3 For the purpose of this article the term "forced or compulsory la-
bour" shall not include:
a any work required to be done in the ordinary course of deten-
tion imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this
Convention or during conditional release from such detention;
b any service of a military character or, in the case of conscien-
tious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service
exacted instead of compulsory military service;
d any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threat-
ening the life or well-being of the community;
e any work or service which forms part of normal civic
obligations.
Article 5 - Right to liberty and security
1 Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
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a the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a compe-
tent court;
b the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance
with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfill-
ment of any obligation prescribed by law;
c the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the pur-
pose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when
it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing
an offence or fleeing after having done so;
d the detention of minor by lawful order for the purpose of edu-
cational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority;
e the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the
spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind,
alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
f the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effect-
ing an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person
against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation
or extradition.
2 Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a lan-
guage which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of
any charge against him.
3 Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1.c of this article shall be brought promptly before a
judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release
pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear
for trial.
4 Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his de-
tention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release or-
dered if the detention is not lawful.
5 Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contra-
vention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable
right to compensation.
Article 6 - Right to a fair trial
1 In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and pub-
lic hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impar-
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tial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part
of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national secur-
ity in a democratic society, where the interest of juveniles or the
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special cir-
cumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice.
2 Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed inno-
cent until proved guilty according to law.
3 Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following mini-
mum rights:
a to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands
and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him;
b to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence;
c to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so
require;
d to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to ob-
tain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
e to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot under-
stand or speak the language used in court.
Article 7 - No punishment without law
1 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence
under national or international law at the time when it was com-
mitted. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
2 This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any
person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was com-
mitted, was criminal according to the general principles of law
recognised by civilised nations.
Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life
1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
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2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exer-
cise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national secur-
ity, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 9 - Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and re-
ligion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.
2 Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protec-
tion of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
Article 10 - Freedom of expression
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas without interference by public authority and re-
gardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, re-
strictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in
a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of in-
formation received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary.
Article 11 - Freedom of assmebly and association
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
HUMAN RIGHTS COURTFall 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
2 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security or public safety,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the
armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
Article 12 - Right to marry
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise
of this right.
Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons act-
ing in an official capacity.
Article 14 - Prohibition of discrimination
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Conven-
tion shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.
Article 15 - Derogation in time of emergency
1 In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of
the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogat-
ing from its obligations under this Convention to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations
under international law.
2 No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting
from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7
shall be made under this provision.
3 Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of deroga-
tion shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons
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therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council
Europe fully informed when such measures have ceased to operate
and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully
executed.
Article 16 - Restrictions on political activity of aliens
Nothing in Articles 10, 11, and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the
High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political
activity of aliens.
Article 17 - Prohibition of abuse of rights
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided
for in the Convention.
Article 18 - Limitation on use of restrictions on rights
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights
and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those
for which they have been prescribed.
Article 34 - Individual applications
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmen-
tal organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth
in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of
this right.
Article 41 - Just Satisfaction
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or
the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting
Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court
shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
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Appendix H
The provisions of Protocols providing substantive rights which have
been adopted since the Convention was established are set out below.
Not every member state has ratified every Protocol.
414
PROTOCOL 1415
Article 1 - Protection of property
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law
and the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control
the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to se-
cure payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
Article 2 - Right to education
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of
any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teach-
ing the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such educa-
tion and teaching in conformity with their own religious and
philosophical convictions.
Article 3 - Right to free elections
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at rea-
sonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure
the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature.
PROTOCOL 4416
Article 2 - Freedom of movement
1 Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence.
2 Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
414. See supra note 36.
415. Protocol 1, supra note 35.
416. Protocol 4, supra note 35.
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3 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.
4 The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject, in particu-
lar areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance with law and justi-
fied by the public interest in a democratic society.
Article 3 - Freedom of expulsion of nationals
1 No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or of a
collective measure, from the territory of the State of which he is a
national.
2 No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the
State of which he is a national.
PROTOCOL 6417
Article 1 - Abolition of the death penalty
The death penalty shall be abolished. No-one shall be condemned to
such penalty or executed. (Article 2 of Protocol 6 created an excep-
tion for times of war. However, the Thirteenth protocol, signed so far
by 22 member states, abolishes this exception.)
PROTOCOL 7418
Article 1 - Procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of
aliens
1. An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be
expelled therefrom except in pursuance of a decision reached in
accordance with law and shall be allowed:
a. to submit reasons against his expulsion,
b. to have his case reviewed, and
c. to be represented for these purposes before the competent
authority or a person or persons designated by that authority.
2. An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his rights under
paragraph 1.a, b and c of this Article, when such expulsion is nec-
417. Protocol 6, supra note 35.
418. Protocol 7, supra note 35.
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essary in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of
national security.
Article 2 - Right of appeal in criminal matters
1. Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall have
the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher
tribunal. The exercise of this right, including the grounds on
which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law.
2. This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to offences of a
minor character, as prescribed by law, or in cases in which the
person concerned was tried in the first instance by the highest
tribunal or was convicted following an appeal against acquittal.
Article 3 - Compensation for wrongful conviction
When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal
offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed, or
he has been pardoned, on the ground that a new or newly discovered
fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage ofjustice, the
person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction
shall be compensated according to the law or the practice of the State
concerned, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown
fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
Article 4 - Right not to be tried or punished twice
1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal
proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an of-
fence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted
in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.
2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the
reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal proce-
dure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly
discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the
previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case.
3. No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of
the Convention.
Article 5 - Equality between spouses
Spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a private
law character between them, and in their relations with their children,
as to marriage, during marriage and in the event of its dissolution.
This Article shall not prevent States from taking such measures as are
necessary in the interests of the children.
[Vol. 40
